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This thesis analyzes the foreign policy of Angola under
its first President, Agostinho Neto. Part one examines the
evolution of the Popular Movenment for the Liberation of
Angola's (MPLA) relations with Angola's northern neighbor
Zaire from the movement's inception in 1956, through the
liberation struggle, post-independant conflicts in Zaire's
Shaba Province and finally rapprochsmenr. The author traces
the effect of changes in Zairian policy on the MPLA's
perceptions of and responses to its regional and interna-
tional environment before and after independence. Part two
outlines the evolution of MPLA policies toward the problems
in southern Angola growing out of the complex forces gener-
ated by the interplay between ethnic: and political conflicts
in the region and Namibia involving the MPLA, the South West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) , the Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) , and South Africa. A
central focus of this thesis is the impact of factional
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I. INTE0D0CTI3N
On November 10, 1975, the High Commissioner Almirante
Leonel Cardosa folded the Portuguese flag for the final time
in Angola and sailed out of Luanda harbor. It was an
historic day. Three centuries of Portuguese colonialism in
Africa had ended. Ey the time Almirante Cardosa set sail a
fragile coalition of three competing regionally and ethni-
cally based liberation fronts negotiated earlier in the year
had already collasped touching off a bitter, complex civil
war. It was the African equivalent of the Spanish Civil
War. On independence day, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) , which controlled Luanda, seized
control. Within three months, the MPLA aided by Soviet arms
and Cuban troops defeated its rivals, the Nationa.1 Front for
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for
the Independence Angola (UNITA) , and began to consolidate
political control.
The effects of the Angolan civil war were far-reaching.
It delivered a series of blows to efforts to expand the
fragile detente that had developed between the United States
and the Soviet Union. The massive Soviet and Cuban inter-
vention en behalf of the MPLA signalled a qualitative change
in the nature of the superpower rivalry in Africa. The
continued Cuban presence in Angola became a major sore point
for some American policy-makers who saw the Cuban troops as
a significant destabilizing factor in southern Africa.
Eight year later, their presence continues to block American
recognition of the Angolan government. For the U.S.S. R.
,
the victory by the MPLA was a major African success and
indicated that Moscow was both able and willing to commit
resources and defend socialist movements and
Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa.
8

Since its independence, Angola has remained a focal
point of international attention. In 1977 and again in
1978 , conflicts in Zaire's Shaba Province revived the rival-
ries that emerged during the Congo Civil War of 1960-1964
and the more recent Angolan conflict. In addition, the MPLA
became inextricably involved in diplomatic efforts authored
by the United Nations to achieve a transition to indepen-
dence for the last remaining African colony, Namibia,
Angola's southern neighbor. By 1981, South African efforts
to defeat the guerrillas of the South West Africa Peopled
Organization (SWAPO) based in southern Angola had led to a
South African military occupation of a 100 mile salient of
Angolan territory. Internally, the MPLA's 1977 decision to
opt for "scientific socialism" and formally convert itself
into a vanguard party added anothsr critical dimension to
the Angolan situation. A Marxist-Leninist regime in Luanda
raised new and perplexing issues for American policy-makers.
This thesis attempts to address these disparate events and
the emergence of Marxism-Leninism by focusing on the evolu-
tion of Angolan foreign policy under its first President,
Agostinho Neto. Two case studies will be examined: 1) the
MPLA's relations with Zaire in the north and 2) its rela-
tion's with the diverse array of actors in the south and its
involvement in the Namibian negotiation process.
Additionally, this thesis will examine the ways in which
the MPLA has perceived and responded to its regional and
international environment. It assumes that a state's
foreign policy is determined by an number of factors
including the ideological predispositions of decision
makers, factional politics and the regime's external envi-
ronment. For the leaders of the MPLA, a central issue has
teen the need to reconcile its Marxist-Leninist ideology and
the prevailing Angolan interests. Ideology predisposes some
MPLA leaders to perceive the world in certain patterned

ways. They regard countries like Zaire, South Africa, and
the United States as unyielding foes who cannot be accomo-
dated. Other less ideological officials believe this
emphasis on ideology prevents an accurate perception of
Angola's regional and international environment. They view
foreign policies in Angolan, not Marxist, terms and see
their foes in less absolute conditions. Over the past eight
years, these two rival perspectives have competed for
control of Anglan foreign poilcy. As a consequence, the
resultant tension has complicated the formulation and imple-
mentation of its foreign initiatives. This thesis also
examines the ways in which this tension has manifested
itself with regard to the Zairian and Namibian issues and
concludes that this tension has shaped the regime's future




II. HPLA IN THE NORTH; FROH CONFLICT TO RAPPROCHEMENT
When a 6,000 man force of Katangan gendarmes, exiles
from an earlier internal conflict, crossed the Zairean
border in May 1978, central Africa once again became the
center of international attention and East-West competition.
Previously, only the climax of the Angolan civil war had
seen such an extraordinary array of international actors in
an African internal conflict. In mid-May 1978, the playing
field was Shaba Province of southern Zaire, a region rich in
resources but torn by ethnic rivalries. On one side, there
were the Katangans allegedly armed and trained by the
Soviets, East Germans, Cubans and Angolans. On the other
side, it was the beleagured regime of Zairean President
Mobutu Sese-Seko assisted in some fashion by the United
States, France, Belgium, Morocco, Eygpt, Sudan, Saudia
Arabia, and China. Probably not since the European meddling
in the Balkans at the start of the century had the world
witnessed such a confusion of ideology, ethnicity,
geopolitics, adventurism, and self-interest. Yet, scarely
two months after the retreat of the battered Katangans,
Angola and Zaire announced a peaceful resolution of their
differences and a normalization of relations. For the first
time in nearly twenty years, their 1300 mile common border
was quiet.
The two Shaba invasions of the late 1970s were not the
only source of instability and friotion between Angola and
Zaire. The invasions marked anothsr chapter in the turbu-
lent history between the two antagonists: the self-
proclaimed Marxist- Leninist regime of the MPLA and the
series of ardently pro-West, anti-Communist leaders of
Zaire. An analysis of MPLA-Zaire relations from the
11

inception cf the Angolan nationalist movement provides a
useful framework for evaluating the root causes of the
antagonism and the 1978 rapprochement. This chapter will
analyze the history of their relations and argue that the
Shaba II invasion provided not only the proper incentive for
rapproachment but also an insight into Angolan foreign
policy decision-making. For the MPLA, buffeted for nearly
twenty years by the centrifugal and centripedal forces
generated by Zairois nationalism, Shaba II offered Angolan
President Agostinho Neto an opportunity to cut his losses
and stabilize the border in the north in order to open ties
with the West and focus attention and resources on the
destabilizing forces in the south.
i. THE PRE-INDEPENDEHCE PERIOD: 1959-1975
Most scholarly research on the history of Angolan
nationalism and the civil war has focused upon the two prin-
cipal liberation movements, the MPLA and the FNLA, their
revolutionary effectiveness, the knitting of their territo-
rial alliances, and the sources of external intervention
before and following the collaspe of the Alvor Accords.
Little research has centered upon what has generated their
effectiveness, alliances, and external assistance: the
relationship of the two exiled movements with the contiguous
African states. This was of paramount importance to the
MPLA who until 1963 lacked a sympathetic neighbor. The
MPLA's antagonistic relationship with Zaire, until 1971
known as Congo-Leopcldville, undermined the juality and
demonstrability of its own internal strength. Instead of a
two dimensional, insurgent versus incumbent (MPLA/FNLA vs
Portuguese) internal conflict usually encountered during the
colonial period, the existence of FNLA-ally Zaire created a
third dimension to the conflict, a dimension complicated by
Zairean politics, nationalism, and ethnicity.
12

On the eve of the Portuguese soup in April 1974, the
MPLA was at a greater military and diplomatic disadvantage
than the FNLA. The MPLA f s inferior position was not solely
attributable to organizational or revolutionary weakness but
instead to partisan, host-state interposition by Zaire
cultivated and exercised throughout the 15 year Angolan
independence struggle. Although Kinshasa claimed its posi-
tion in the Angolan civil war stemmed from ideological
considerations, Zaire's opposition to the MPLA and its
affinity with the FNLA was based primarily on ethnic and
personal compatability. The MPLA drew its st hnopopulist
support from the Mbundu groups of aorth-central Angola who
historically were the implacable foes of the Bakongo peoples
of northern Angola and southwestern Zaire. The Bakongo,
from whom the FNLA drew its popular support, have also been
the dominant force in Zairois pDlitics and nationalism
throughout its history. As a result, not only did Angolan
nationalism interwine with Zairois nationalism but each
post-independent Zairean leader frequently manipulated each
Angolan liberation movement to serve Zairois interests. On
nearly all occasions during the independence struggle,
however, the MPLA was the loser.
1 . The MPLA a nd Congolese Indepe ndence
The Angolan national movement began somewhat unnot-
iceably in the slums of Luanda and the coffee plantations
areas in north. In the years leading to the independence of
the Belgian Congo, it was primarily the activities of the
Bakongo in northern Angola and in Leopoldville that plagued
the MPLA. The MPL A-centered activities in Luanda and the
OPA (The Uniao das Populacoes de Angola, later to become the
FNLA) activities in the north initially sparked apprehension
within the Portuguese colonial administration in Luanda.
The 1958 Portuguese national elections and the rioting in
13

Laopoldville triggered by the ABAKO (Bakongo) party,
however, sent shock waves through Angola. The Portuguese
overseas police (PIDE, Policia Internacional de Def esa de
Istado) infiltrated the nationalist movements but most PIDE
repression was directed at the urban MPLA. By 1960, waves
of arrests and jail sentences had so devastated the MPLA
that it was unable to lead an armed revolution from within
the cities. With most of its leaders in jail and incapable
of transcending its urban origins, the remaining elite,
mostly mesticos, fled in February 1960 to Conakry, Guinea.
The rank and file, mostly blacks, fled to the bush. [1]
Consequently, when violence erupted in Luanda and in the
northern coffee plantations during February-March 1961,
mostly at Bakongo instigation, thus announcing the Angolan
revolution, the MPLA was in exile and separated by 2200
miles from its ethnopopulist political base.
In the period 1956-1960, the MPLA faced a hostile
environment both within Angola as Portuguese jails swallowed
its leaders and in the Congo as political turbulence under
Belgian auspices denied it support. In Conakry, therefore,
the MPLA established and actively pursued two political-
military goals: (1) to achieve a common front, or
pan-Angolan, coalition with the UPA and (2) to gain access
to an exile operational base close to Angola, preferably in
Leopoldville. These goals, which formed the foundation of
its "foreign policy" until 1975, reflected not only the
MPLA*s inferior insurgent position but also the importance
of the role contiguous African states would play in the
Angolan civil war. The independence of the Belgian Congo on
June 28, 1960 sparked new hopes for the MPLA. Heretofore
blocked by the Belgian colonial authorities, the MPLA hoped
the newly elected Premier, Patrice Lumumba, would grant the
exiled movement an operational base.
14

2- Jun e-S eptember 1 96 : Lumumba
Although Congo-Leopoldville was the first state in
the region to gain independence, the HPLA was denied access
to Angola and inhibited in the pursuit of a common front
strategy largely due to the personal and ethnic considera-
tions of Patrice Lumumba. In the wave of independence fever
that swept Africa in the late 1950s and early 196 0s, Lumumba
embraced the leader cf the Angolan Bakongo, Holden Roberto,
as a revolutionary egual. The two originally met at the
Cercle des Jvolues in Stanleyville in 1948 while Roberto was
an accountant for the Belgian colonial administration- They
reunited at the 1957 All-African Peoples Conference in
Accra. There, they were introduced and then adopted the
ideological views of Franz Fanon and Kwame Nkrumah. In
January 1960, at the 2nd All-African Peoples Conference in
Tunis, Lumumba invited his personal and ideological friend
to mount his campaign for the liberation of Angola from
Leopoldville after Congolese independence. [2]
These overt considerations aotwithstandin g, the MPLA
also found itself on the outside of Congolese nationalism
and ethnic politics. Lumumba, from Kasai Province, took the
Premiership in Leopcldville, as an outsider. The new
Congolese Parliament and capital were dominated by the
Leopoldville-based ABAKO party lei by the newly elected
President, Joesph Kasavubu. In the years leading to inde-
pendence, Kasavubu had championed the revival of the
historic Kongo Kingdom as an alternative to Congolese inde-
pendence and, as a result, had earned considerable political
clout throughout Leopoldville Province. Lumumba perceived
Roberto as a counter balance to the political strength of
Kasavubu. While the politics and alliance composition of
the early days of Congolese indspendence are extremely
complex and beyond the scope of this thesis, Lumumba's
15

invitation to Roberto in effect recognized the FNLA as the
sole representative of Angolan nationalism.
The FNLA quickly capitalizad on Lumumbas vigorous
support. In the months after Congolese independence, the
FNLA broadcasted a series of weekly messages in French,
Portuguese, and in Angolan dialects such as Kikongo to its
supporters over Radio Leopoldville. The C ongo ,
Leopoldville's Lumumbist daily newspaper, published many of
Roberto's speeches. [3] Thanks to Lumumba, the FNLA enjoyed
sole access to the Angolan frontiers. Meanwhile, the exiled
MPLA leadership wallowed in Conakry. In September 1960,
after two tumultuous months, Kasavubu dismissed Prime
Minister Lumumba and assumed power. [4]
3- September 19 60-Auq ust 1961 : Kasavubu
On the surface, the MPLA saw no hope of gaining
access tc Angola and of convincing Roberto to adopt a
pan-Angolan front. Kasavubu saw the intelluctual
mestico-led MPLA as a threat to his dream of a trans-Bakongo
state and of Bakongo domination in Leopoldville. The MPLA'
s
increasing ties during this period with radical African
nationalist leaders and radical opinion, in conjunction with
its exile base in Ccnakry, generated the perception in
Leopoldville that the MPLA was a Communist-directed move-
ment. [5] Publically, Kasavubu supported Roberto's aims for
an independent Angola. During this period, Kasavubu
continued tc shut off the MPLA from access to Leopoldville
and consistenly blocked MPLA contact with their supporters
in the Dembos-Nambuangango forest region north of Luanda.
Kasavubu*s position vis-a-vis Angolan nationalism and the
independence struggle, however, was much more subtle.
During this period, criticism of the MPLA was muted, the




One of the chief issues of conflict between Kasavubu
and Roberto was the role of the Bakongo in Congolese poli-
tics and Angolan nationalism. Their personal rivalry
spilled over into the positions adopted by their parties.
As noted above, Kasavubu and the ABAKO party, even after
independence, pursued policies and interests that promoted
the revival of the Bakongo state, a state which encompassed
the Bakongo peoples living in the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville,
and Angola. Alarmed by these schemes, Roberto urged an
unified Angolan Bakongo position for the FNLA. These
conflicting aims were exacerbated by the events surrounding
the rebellion in northern Angola and the turmoil of
Congolese politics in Leopoldville. In February- April 1961,
the tensions in the region exploded after the Bakongo
revolts and the subseguent PIDE repression. By April,
150,000 Bakongo had fled into the Congo. Kasavubu perceived
the emigres as a potential regime threatening source that
not only brought Portuguese forces closer to borders of the
newly independent Congo but also strengthened the political
position of Roberto in Leopoldville. As a result, Kasavubu
loyalists and the AEAKO harassed FNLA officials and aided
the Bakongo off-shoot, anti-FNLA Ngwizako party. [6] In
early July 1961, in an interview with a Le Monde correspon-
dent, Kasavubu implied that his government might ask the
FNLA to cease all activity in the Congo and was considering
the expulsion of Roberto. [7]
Although the FNLA's political power and influence in
Leopoldville waned under Kasavubu, Kasavubu was unwilling to
allow the MPLA access to the Congo. enable to gain access
to Angola and blocked by the conservative regimes in
Leopoldville and Brazzaville, [8] the MPLA conducted a
diplomatic-political offensive designed to gain increased
international support and to pressure the contiguous African
states and Roberto into accepting the MPLA strategy. If
17

there really existed the danger that the central
Leopoldville government would suppress the FNLA, it was
short lived. In August 1961, Roberto's position remarkably
improved when Kasavubu appointed Roberto's old friend,
Cyrille Adoula, as Premier.
U. August 1961 -July 19 64: Adoula
In October 1961, with the Adoula [9] government
under intensive international pressure, the MPLA moved its
exile headquarters from Conakry to Leopoldville. [10]
Adoula, fearing an MPLA challenge to the FNLA, moved to
isolate the MPLA militarily and diplomatically. He used the
FNLA forces and his own army, the Armee Nacional du Cong o
(ANC) , to intercept, disarm, attack, and often jail MPLA
officials in Leopoldville and reinforcements columns en
route to the Angolan border. [11] Additionally, Adoula
refused to authorize arms shipments to the MPLA from its
principle suppliers, Algeria and Morocco. When the MPLA
circumvented that policy, Adoula required that all
MPLA-bound aris shipments be brought into Leopoldville by
easily mcnitored air transport. [12]
In January 1963, under increasing international
scrutiny by MPLA supporters in the OAU, Adoula offered the
MPLA its only access route to the Angolan border. The route
was, however, in the heavily Bakongo populated Fuesse region
of northern Angola where the FNLA eajoyed its greatest mili-
tary strength and successes. [13] The route became mere of
an obstacle course for MPLA military units and severely
restricted its ability to transport arms and extend insur-
gency operations into Angola. Those few MPLA partisans who
were able to elude Portuguese patrols in Angola were often
quickly decimated by the FNLA guerrillas. The paltry mili-
tary effectiveness that the MPLA was able to generate during
this period was constrained and mostly demolished by the
18

interference of the Adoula regime. This was demonstrated
when the MPLA's fledging army made its debut in Cabinda on
January 29, 1963. It was easily and swiftly routed by the
Portuguese.
Diplomatically, Adoula further isolated the MPLA
from its international supporters who had been the move-
ment's only claim of revolutionary credibility. The
founding conference of the OAU in May 1963 provided Adoula a
perfect opportunity. At the conferBnce, Adoula and Roberto,
who travelled to the conference on adoula' s plane, proposed
the creation of an African LiberatiDn Committee (ALC) to aid
liberation groups in southern Africa. [14] The OAU
concurred, and at its first meeting in Dar es Salaam in
June, the committee send a goodwill mission to Leopoldville
to reconcile differences within the FNLA and MPLA. Adoula
did not wait for the committee to act. On the eve of the
Congo's third anniversary of independence and several days
before the arrival of the ALC mission, Adoula declared his
government's recognition of the FNLA as the de jure govern-
ment of Angola. [15] Adoula 's intimidation, together with an
untimely and complex power struggle within the MPLA leader-
ship found by the ALC during its leetings in Leopoldville,
[16] led the ALC to recommend formal recognition of the FNLA
as the sole Angolan liberation movement to the OAU. [17] In
July 1964, the OAU agreed. For the MPLA, it was a
political-diplomatic disaster of the worst proportions
attributed by Neto to the debilitating obstruction by the
Adoula regime.
A seasoned observer of Angolan affairs, author Basil
Davidson, wrote of the MPLA turmoil in the summer of 1963
that the MPLA "...had ceased to exist and should be forth-
with ignored." [18] Kasavubu, meanwhile, was extremely
disturbed with Roberto's increasing strength in Congolese
politics. Several weeks after Adoula' s de jure recognition
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of the FNLA, Kasavubu arranged for Congo-Brazzaville
President Youlou, who also feared the increased strength of
the FNLA in Cabinda as well, to invite the MPLA to
Brazzaville. Youlu agreed on the condition that Neto refuse
to oppose both Cabindan independence and the annexation of
Cabinda by the Brazzaville. [19] His movement isolated and
its legitimacy questioned, Neto had no choice but to accept
Youlou* s offar in early August. The decision to flee
Leopoldville was to have profound implications for the MPLA.
Youlou's overthrow on August 14th, and the installation of
the ideologically compatible regime of President
Massamba-Debat allowed the MPLA to reorganize it leadership
and resurrect its image internationally.
Although it achieved an exile operational base
closer to Angola during Adoula's tenure in Leopoldville, the
MPLA was continually frustrated in the pursuit of its
overall strategy. The diminution of MPLA political and
military effectiveness and the blocking of its access to the
Angolan frontier correspondingly increased not only FNLA
strength in Leopoldville but also FNLA military fortunes in
Angola. As a result, with its bargaining leverage devas-
tated, the MPLA was unable to convince Roberto to accept its
common front strategy. The exigencss and centrifugal forces
of Congolese politics and nationalism that buffeted the MPLA
during this period implanted an indelible mark upon its
future perception of subsequent Leopoldville (and later
Kinshasa) governments.
5« July 1 964-No vember 196 5: Tshombe
Adoula's position considerably weakened in 1964 due
to an insurgent movement from Congo-Brazzaville anda rural
rebellion in the areas of Kasai and Orientals Provinces
still loyal to Lumumba's former Vice Premier Antoine
Ginzenga. On July 9th, Adoula resigned. Kasavubu
20

astonished everyone by recalling Moise Tshombe from exile in
Spain and appointing him Premier. The MPLA, though based in
Brazzaville, found its access to Angola still blocked
throughout this period. The exigencies of Congolese ethnic,
regional and intenational politics under Tshombe, however,
had profound ramifications for the MPLA f s later movement to
eastern Angola and their post-independent relations with the
Katangan gendarmes (discussed below, pp. 26-30) . It was
also during Tshombe's reign that the MPLA's relations with
the Congo developed into two distinct and exclusive
patterns, one set of factors relevant in Leopoldville and
another set in the other areas, particularly in Katanga
Province.
In Leopoldville Province, Tshombe pursued policies
of gradual suffocation and splintering of both the MPLA and
FNLA. His fierce and ethnically motivated distrust of the
Bakongo and his personal hatred of President Kasavubu, stem-
ming from the conflict over Katangan secession, prohibited
active regime support of the FNLA. Although the MPLA had no
direct antagonism with him, Tshombe* s friendship with and
financial assistance from the Portuguese colonial regime,
both during the Katangan succession and in Leopoldville,
precluded any support or appearance of support for the MPLA.
On the other hand, Tshombe had inherited from Adoula an
anti-Congo insurgency based in Brazzaville, the Comite
National Nationale de Libertion (CNL) , and faced an hostile
OAO* who questioned the legitimacy of his rule. [20] By the
quirks of African international politics the geographic zone
in which the FNLA operated made the FNLA a valuable fighting
force for Tshombe against the CNL and MPLA incursions from
Brazzaville.
In southern Zaire, heretofore divorced from Angolan
nationalist struggle, Tshombe' s presence in Leopoldville led
to the crysrallization of ethnic alliances that had
21

previously surfaced during the succession years. The Lunda
and the Bemba, friends of Tshombe, aligned against the
Chokwe and the Lula, who were the implaceable foes of the
Lunda and, therefore, also of Tshombe. The center of the
Chokwe empire, however, was in eastern Angola adjacent to a
large population of Lunda and Lula. The Chokwe and the Lula
then aligned with the FNLA who, again based upon Katangan
conflict, was perceived by the Chokwe as a direct ally of
Kasavubu.The picture became further muddled in 1964 when
FNLA Foreign Minister Jonas Savimbi resigned. In 1966, he
founded ONITA, a tenuous coalition of the Ovimbundu,
Ngangela, and Chokwe ethnic groups of southern and eastern
Angola. These groups, interestingly, were eneaies of each
other at one time or another during Angolan history.
Although MPLA activity during this period focused on Cabinda
and northern Angola, the mere presence of Tshombe in
Leopoldville generated a complex and byzantine mosaic of
ethnic alliances that, ironically, smoothed the introduction
of MPLA military forces and the creation of the Third Front
in eastern Angola in 1966. [21]
In the fifteen turbulent months of the Tshombe
regime, MPLA political and insurgsnt activity continued to
be stymied by a combination of Congolese, FNLA, Portuguese,
and Con go- Brazzaville political, ethnic, and military
forces. In the autumn of 1965, Congolese politics took a
new turn as President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe and
appointed as Premier Evariste Kimba, Tshombe's former
Katangan Foreign Minister. After several weeks of political
confusion, the head of the amy. Lieutenant General
Joesph-Desire Mobutu, overthrew Kasavubu. [22] Mobutu 1 s
assencion to power once again placed a friend and political
ally of Roberto in Leopoldville.
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6 . November 1 96 5-November 1975 : Mobutu
The MPLA's turbulent relationship with Mobutu during
this period has been well documented elsewhere. [23] There
are r however, two crucial points that have particular impor-
tant implications for this thesis- First, more than his
precedessors, Mobutu personally Bncouraged and actively
supported Zairois and FNLA harassment of MPLA military units
in Cafcinda and along the Angolan frontier. Second, however,
unlike his precedessors Mobutu brokered an FNLA-MPLA recon-
ciliation during a period of severe FNLA weakness even as he
ardently pursued policies of MPLA harassment. The subtetly
of Mobutu 1 s position was not lost ipon the post- independent
MPLA leadership.
Under Mobutu, the suffocation of the FNLA pursued by
Tshombe was quickly reversed as Mobutu launched vigorous and
widespread anti-MPLA activities. MPLA columns en route to
Angola were attacked and often killed by Zairois and FNLA
forces with brutual savagery reminiscent of the Adoula
reign. Mobutu also resumed Kinshasa's active meddling in
Cabinda on the side of the pro-Zairois Luis Rangue Franque
wing of FLEC. Although the rejeunvation of the Franque wing
conflicted with FNLA activity in Cabinda, it so frightened
the Brazzaville government that most MPLA activity in
Cabinda was curtailed and until mid-1975 nearly all
MPLA-bound Soviet arms shipments were redirected to the
Brazzaville supported wing of FLEC. [ 24 ] In the years
leading to Angolan independence, Mobutu became the personal
conduit cf arms for the FNLA. While his ties to the United
States and South African support for the FNLA are well
known, Mobutu personally undertook efforts to broadend FNLA
ties with other states. His diplomatic drives generated
international recognition and arms deliveries from China
(1966, 1973), North Korea ( 1973-1 974) , Rumania (197U), India
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(1967, 1974) , Libya (1974) , and several West European
countries. [25
]
Mobutu's personal intervention in the Angolan liber-
ation struggle on the side of the FNLA resulted in two
significant implications for the MPLA. First, unable to
launch raids or to dispatch reinforcement columns from
Brazzaville, the MPLA was forced to move its primary mili-
tary operations into eastern Angola even though those opera-
tions were farther frcm the MPLA's 5 thnopopulist support and
from its arms suppliers. Second, despite its weak position
militarily, the MPLA benefited greatly from Mobutu's staunch
and public identification with the FNLA. The MPLA leader-
ship's assertion as the only "non-aligned" Angolan libera-
tion movement brought increased international recognition
and support. The resumption of Soviet military aid and the
Cuban training of MPLA guerrillas in Brazzaville several
months after the CIA-orchestrated Mobutu coup and the expo-
nential increase in Soviet arms shipments in early 1975 on
the heels of the arrival of a 112 man Chinese military
contingent, led by a Major General, in June 1974, are but
two examples of Neto's bargaining leverage with the interna-
tional community.
In December 1972 under OAO" auspices, the MPLA and
FNLA finally agreed to end all hostilities with each other
and to create a union of the two movements under a Con selho
Supremo de Libertacao de Angola (CSLA) . [26] Mobutu served
as the principle OAO mediator in ths reconciliation. His
motivations, however, were suspeot. A series of events
occured in late 1971 through mid-1972 that seriously under-
mined Roberto's and FNLA strength in the liberation
struggle. In December 1971, the OAU withdrew recognition of
Roberto's government in exile, the 3RAE. Then the following
March, a serious rebellion against Roberto erupted at the
FNLA's Kinkuzu staging area along the Angolan border. The
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dispute pitted Bakongo and non-Bakongo (Chokwe, Pende,
Basusu, etc.) FNLA partisans that required the intervention
of the Zairois army when fighting spilled to neighboring
villages. Moreover, a reassessment of Chinese central
African policy, precipitated by the gradual decline of
influence in the region and the subsequent ouster from its
principal base in Brazzaville in early 1972, resulted in the
resumption of aid to the MPLA and Neto's June 1972 visit to
Peking. [ 27] Perceiving the FNLA as racked by internal
disarray and, perhaps more importantly, a shift of interna-
tional support toward the MPLA, Mobutu intervened and
convinced Roberto to engage in a reconciliation with Neto.
Mobutu convened the talks in Brazzaville in June 1972. In
the months following the December 1972 agreement, Mobutu
placed the FNLA under Zairois tutelage, integrated FNLA
forces into the Zairios army, eased Roberto out of the
decision-making, and embarked upon an exhausative tour of
world capitals in search of international support for the
FNLA. As he championed pan-Angolan unity, Mobutu resusci-
tated the beleaguered FNLA. The agreement, meanwhile,
caused serious problems for the MPLA. The rapproachment
with the FNLA under a CSLA provoked another severe rift in
the MPLA leadership. Neto, who favored the agreement,
purged several left-wing leaders. [28] Confused by the
reconciliation and the purge of the more ideologically
committed, the Soviets once again halted arms shipments.
The agreement, only months before the Portuguese coup, had
the ironic consequence of reviving the FNLA and fracturing
the MPLA.
7. The Katangans
In the analysis of Zairois politics, nationalism and
external support during the Angolan civil war, a distinct
pattern in the south often in conflict with that in the
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north can be discerned. In the south, ethnic considerations
ensured that the Lunda population in Katanga Province would
side with any groups opposed to the Bakongo-dominated FNLA.
These considerations also spilled over into Angolan ethnic
politics such that as the ethnic brethen of the Angolan
Lunda, the Katangan Lunda would also side with any group
opposed to the Ovimbundu/Chokwe/Ngangela-dominated tJNITA.
With the end of Tshombe^s secession effort in 1963 and the
ccllaspe of the second Zairois rebellion in 1967, the
Katangan Lunda, or Katangans as they became known, fled
Zairios persecution into the MoxicD and Lunda Provinces of
eastern Angola. Their entry into the Angolan political
scene altered the regional balance and proved to be an irri-
tating source of friction not only for the Portuguese but
also for Zaire, ONITA, and the post-independent MPLA.
The Katangan exile in Angola during the civil war
was a complex and remarkable saga. Organized, trained,
armed, and financed by Belgian mining companies as the
Provincial militia, the Katangans were a formidable force
during the secession attempt of 1960-1963 by Hoise Tshombe.
After the secession effort collasped, many Katangans,
numbering about 5,000 (of whom 1,030 were soldiers), with
their weapons, fled nearly en masse and quietly settled with
their ethnic cousins in Angola. When Tshombe emerged in
Leopoldville as Premier, most Katangans returned. Tshombe
quickly integrated them into the national army and then
unleashed the Katangans upon all anti-Tshombe dissident
elements in Kwango, Kasai, Lulaba, and Katanga Provinces.
[29] The target of their attacks in southern Zaire were the
Chokwe and the Lula as the Katangans utilized the pretext of
rebel association to settle age-old ethnic animosities. In
August 1964, unable to defeat the rebellion led by Antoine
Gizenga in Stanleyville with Mobutu* s poorly trained troops,
Tshombe called upon his Katangan militia. Aided by 600
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Belgian paratroopers, mercenaries led by Major "Mad Mike"
Hoare, and US logistical support, the Katangans stormed
Stanleyville and slaughtered 80,003 Congolese. [30] When
Mobutu came to power in November 1965, the Katangans once
again fled into eastern Angola. Many remained and in July
1966 were key participants in a two-month rebellion against
Mobutu. The Portuguese colonial administration, longtime
supporters of Tshombe during the secession and later in
Leopoldville, for the first time faced mushrooming insurgent
activity in eastern Angola. Not surprisingly, the
Portuguese colonial officials welcomed the Katangans. The
Portuguese trained, armed, and organized the Katangan
militia into a separate antity, similar to the "Flechas"
(Black Arrows) , under Portuguese military control. The
Katangans were resettled along the Benguela Railway at the
key garrison towns of Luso and Lumege. [31] Although the
Portuguese employed them against all Angolan liberation
movements in eastern Angola, the Katangans were eager to
manifest their traditional hostility against the FNLA and
ONITA. It is interesting to note, however, the Katangans
distrusted Savimbi not only for his allegiance to the Chokwe
but also because of his earlier ties to Roberto,
Leopoldville, and the FNLA.
The end of the second Zairois rebellion in 1967
brought thousands more Lunda into angola and the saga took
another turn. Nathaniel Mbumda, until 1967 a police officer
and a driver for Gecamines (Le Gensral des Carrieres et des
Mines du Zaira) in Katanga Province, organized the Katangans
in Angola into the Front for the National Liberation of the
Congo (FNLC). [32] Although it claimed to be a progessive
and revolutionary movement, ths FNLC*s only unifying
idsology was the violent overthrow of the Mobutu regime.
Numbering perhaps 10,000 and their sights set on an eventual
return to Zaire, the Katangans exeroised increasing autonomy
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in eastern Angola. Many worked in the South African owned
and managed Diamang diamond mine in Lunda Province and
others engaged in subsistence agriculture in their resettled
areas.. Most Katangans, however as French speakers in a
Portuguese colony, lived by the grace of the FNLC organiza-
tion and their relatives in Zaire. [33] By the early 1970s,
the Portuguese ability and willingness to mobilize the
Katangans for counter-insurgency operations had rapidly
declined thanks primarily to the MPLA and UNITA military
failures in the east. Moreover, the Katangans refused to
recognize Portuguese administrative and judicial authority.
Mbumda, meanwhile, had carved an impressive empire in
eastern Angola with his own laws, prisons, self-help associ-
ations, and administrative structure. On the eve of the
Portuguese coup, the Katangans had become a forceful state
within a state. [34
]
The gradual withdrawal of the Portuguese military
forces from eastern Angola and the approaching Angolan inde-
pendence created new political realities for the Portuguese
and the Katangans. [35] In late December 1974, in order to
balance the military strength and to encourage the partici-
pation of all liberation movements ai ^he mid-January
conference at Alvor, Portuguese High Commissioner Almirante
Rosa Coutinho arranged and negotiated a military alliance
between Neto and Mbunda. [36] The struggle between the MPLA,
FNLA, and UNITA for dominance during this period placed
Mbumda in a difficult position. Mbumda perceived that his
FNLC would have to make peace with the new govnment in
Luanda in order to protect his gains and autonomy. Although
ethnic considerations eliminated an alliance the FNLA and
UNIT A, Mbunda did not fully trust Neto or the MPLA f s ideolo-
gical flavor. In late April or early May 1975, Mbunda
formally offered his militia to the embattled MPLA for
friendly considerations after independence. The offer
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clearly posed a dilemma for the MPLA. On one hand, the
Katangans had formerly allied with the colonial Portuguese
and were an ideologically unruly farce that probably could
not be controlled. On the other hand, the MPLA feared the
Katangans would turn elsewhere. Aq alliance with the FNLC,
however, would satisfy the MPLA*s multiracial bonafides.
Additionally, at a severs military disadvantage, the MPLA
perceived that the Katangans could be used against the FNLA
in the north. Pragmatism overcame ideology. The MPLA sided
with Mbunda and within a few weeks Soviet arms began to flow
to the Katangans. Although most attention has focused upon
the Soviet and Cuban intervention in the civil war, the
Katangan militia played a major role in the final months of
the war. The Katangans aided in stemming the FNLA/UNITA
advance at Kifangango in late October and retook Caxito from
the FNLA in early November 1975. [37] Furthermore, the
gendarmes were generally credited with organizing the
successful defense of Luanda prior to arrival of the Cubans.
[38] At the completion of the war, Neto awarded the
Katangans several economic concessions that had previously
belonged to the Portuguese in the area of Tshikapa and
Texeira de Sousa in Lunda Province and promised to return
the Katangans to Zaire. The autonomy exerted during the
colonial period continued unabated as Mbumda consolidated
his imposing empire and, as with the Portuguese, contested
Luanda 1 s authority at all levels.
8. Summary
The MPLA's two-pronged strategy employed throughout the
liberation struggle was, first, tD gain an exile sanctuary
in order to conduct raids and to reinforce its partisans in
the Dembos-Nambuangango sector, and, second, to pursue an
FNLA-MPLA common front policy. With the exception of
selected pockets of resistance around Luanda, the MPLA was
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never permanmently based inside the colony and was consis-
tently denied operational access in the north. As a result,
MPLA military operations never received intimate collobora-
tion from African peasants, even in the third front region
of eastern Angola, nor developed the military potential of
its small partisan force in exile or inside the colony.
Additionally, the MPLA, and Neto in particular, tenuously
navigated the stormy ideological waters at great peril in
order to consistently pursue the common front policy.
Although it can be argued that MPLA motives were derived
from its inferior position throughout the civil war, Neto
willingly and earnestly sought a common front much to the
consternation of the leadership and often his principal
international supporters. Many of the difficulties and
weaknesses encountered from 1956-1975 were attributable not
only to the Portuguese and the FNLA but also in large part
to the prevailing regime in Kinshasa. The MPLA found itself
at the mercy of the centrifugal and centripedal political,
ethnic, nationalist, and personal forces generated by Zaire.
It was not surprising, therefore, that when it declared
independence on November 11, 1975, the MPLA turned its
Soviet guns and Cuban forces upon and demolished the FNLA
and Zairois military first and then upon UNITA and South
Africa later.
B. POST-IHDEPENDENT PERIOD: THE ROAD TO SHABA I
In one of his first foreign policy positions, Angola's
first President, Agostinho Neto, actively sought detente
with his neighbors. His intentions were clear, he wanted to
stabilize all Angolan borders as the MPLA consolidated its
position internally. Neto actively solicited peace with his
antagonistic neighbors, Zaire, Zambia, and even South
Africa, a policy similiar to the common front strategy
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pursued during the liberation struggle. On February 2,
1976 , Neto publicly announced his desire to normalize with
Zaire and Zambia. Neto and Mobutu met under the auspices of
Congo President Ngoubai in Brazzaville on February 28-29,
1976. In a communique issued at the conclusion of the
summit, the two leaders agreed to stabilize their common
border, repatriate refugees residing on both sides of the
border, and to establish diplomatic relations in the near
future. Mobutu promised to respect the territorial integ-
rity of Angola and to discontinue support for the FNLA and
ONITA. Neto agreed to reopen the Benguela Railway to
Zairian cargo and to forbid any military activity from
Angola to be organized against Zaire. [39] In April, after
lengthy negotiations and a history of mutual antagonisms not
unlike those shared with Zaire, Angolan and Zambia extended
diplomatic recognition. At peace with his northern and
eastern neighbors, Neto was then able to turn his attention
southward and, though reluctantly, to acquiesce to Castro's
announced intention of withdrawing all Cuban troops. [ 40 ]
Enforcement of the Brazzaville agreement, however,
particularly given the complexity and history of
Angola-Zaire relations, proved difficult.
1 . Trouble with Mob utu
With his dream of a sympathetic regime in Luanda
disintegrating with the fortunes of the FNLA and Zairois
forces, an alarmed Mobutu hastily retreated. Mobutu, as
reflected in his concessions at the Brazzaville summit, was
concerned about
.
the entrenched, anti-Kinshasa regime's
ability to strangle Zaire's only two outlets to the sea— the
Benguela Railroad and the Zaire Estuary. He was also appre-
hensive about the political ramifications of his inability
to prevent Cuban bombings of Zairois villages. As a result,
Mobutu sought to appease the MPLA and the disgruntled
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international community. In late January 1976, he declared
that he would no longer insist upon the inclusion of the
FNLA in an Angolan government. [41] On February 3rd, after a
meeting with Roberto and Savimbi in Kinshasa, Mobutu
announced that he was "neutral" in the Angolan conflict and
would no longer allow anti-MPLA mercanaries to transit
Zaire. [42] In an improved diplomatic climate, Mobutu then
met with Neto in Brazzaville and further assuaged MPLA
officials.
Meanwhile, despite official disclaimers, Mobutu
stepped up covert assistance to the FNLA and FLEC, and in
the spring of 1976 began in conjunction with South Africa a
major air resupply effort to UNITA. [43] In mid-January
1976, aided by Zairois troops, the Frangue wing of FLEC
launched a last ditch effort to claim Cabinda and oust not
only the Cuban troops but also the Brazzaville supported
Henrique N'Zita wing of FLEC. When the attack ended in
failure, Mobutu only then announced in late January the
closure of the Cabindan border. [44] To bolster his regime
after the series of military failures in Angola, Mobutu
concluded a substantial arms assistance agreement with the
United States during the April 1976 visit of Secretaries
Henry Kissinger and Donald Rumsfeld. [45] Within weeks of
the arms agreement, FNLA attacks in the Bakongo areas, DNITA
activity in the south, and FLEC raids in Cabinda were
revived. [46] Clearly, Mobutu's strategy during this period
was similar to his position during the 1972 FNLA-MPLA
reconciliation.
By the summer of 1976, the spirit of the Brazzaville
summit had considerably deteriorated. With substantial
justification, Neto claimed in June that "...ia the north,
in the south, and also, I think in the east, there are enemy
troops encircling and helping to infiltrate guerrillas into
our country." [47] Sensing the increasing turbulence in the
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region, the OAU attempted to reconcile the differences. In
July, under the auspices of the 0A0* , Nigerian Foreign
Minister, Joesph Garba, offered his offices for talks
between Neto and Mobutu on mutual security. After seme
initial success, the talks broke down and the mediation
effort collasped. [ 48] The prevailing climate was ripe for
conflict. But as attention in Kinshasa and the West focused
upon the Soviet and Cuban activity, General Mbumda* s
belligerence had increasingly posed problems for Neto.
2. Katangan Belligerence
Implicit in the Brazzaville agreement, Neto had
agreed to prevent the Katangans from conducting any activi-
ties directed against Kinshasa and eventually to repatriate
them to Zaire. Initially, Neto succeeded in convincing
Mbumda to move his forces away from the border, but diffi-
culties quickly ensued. In late Deombar 1975, Nsto provided
his offices to effect a reconciliation among the various
anti-Mobutu groups. [49] Included, among others, were the
FNLC, the Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP) led by
Laurent Kabila, the forces under Antoine Gizenga, and the
Brazzaville-based CNL. Although Mbumda was not opposed to
an alliance with Kabila, he adamantly refused an association
with Gizenga, stemming mainly from Mbumda*s affiliation with
Union Minere and from Gizenga* s position in the anti-Tshombe
Lumumba government of the early 1960s. Mbumda finally
agreed under intense pressure from Neto, a close friend of
Gizenga. The alliance, however, quickly degenerated.
Mbumda imprisoned two Sizenga representatives sent to
eastern Angola to discuss the accord. Later, he jailed Jean
Tshombe, the son of Moise Tshombe, who had arrived to join
the alliance. Neto, who effected the alliance solely to
diffuse the independent strength of -he Katangans, was
outraged. In the fall, he dispatched units of the Angolan
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army and forcefully released all prisoners held by the FNLC.
Moreover, the Katangans precipitatsd other problems for the
MPLA's efforts at internal consolidation. The Katangans
were an unruly community, frequently raided nearby Angolan
towns in search for food, and generally resisted all MPLA
local authority. Without sufficient administrative manpower
in the region, the MPLA was able to exert little ability to
control or influence Mbumda's empirs. In late January 1977,
eager not to set an FNLC revolt, the Angolan Defense
Ministry ordered General Mbumda to Luanda for, it stated,
medical reasons. In reality, Mbumia was placed under house
arrest and, at Neto's insistence, Cuban troops were moved
into eastern Angola.
3. External Cha llen ges
Even with Mbumda safely dstained in Luanda, Neto
faced serious challenges to his regime both externally and
internally. To the north, an Zairois army major offensive
directed at the PRP in Kasai Province spilled over into
Angola inciting ethnic disturbances in Lunda Province. [50]
The fractured and leaderless FNLA, armed by Mobutu, even
launched frequent border attacks. In the south, ONITA raids
grew more sophisticated and widespread and South Africa
stepped up attacks into Angola against SWAPO guerrillas.
Against this backdrop, on February 24, 1977, Neto summoned
the foreign diplomatic community in Luanda and announced
that he had discovered a plot called Operation Cobra 77,
known in Angola as Operation Christmas, directed against the
MPLA. [51] According to Neto, the plot consisted of a
four-pronged attack on Angola from Cabinda, Zaire, Namibia,
and from the Atlantic Ocean. The operation, scheduled to be
launched in September, involved coordinated attacks by
UNITA, FNLA, FLEC, Zaire, South Africa, France, Gabon, and
anti-communist Portuguese elements supported by several
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international commercial interests (ELF, etc.). In March,
Castro arrived in Luanda on a state visit as pam of his
month-long African tcur and, after consultations with Neto,
reversed his troop withdrawal policy. Whether the plot was
real or imaginary, the belief in Luanda that the same array
of actors who had battled the MPLA only a year earlier were
once again plotting intervention generated alarm and shock
within the ruling elite. [52]
*• Internal Cha llenges
Internally, as the mystique of the revolutionary
victory wore off, Neto also faced serious challenges to his
domestic and foreign policies from not only the whites and
mesticos but also the rank and file blacks. The pro-Soviet
left-wing was alarmed at Neto*s foreign policy direction
which sought a reduced economic dependence on the Soviet
bloc, reconciliation with Zaire, and negotiations with the
South Africans. The rank and file blacks, principally those
who led partisan units in the Denbos forests during the
liberation struggle, criticized Neto's lack of revolutionary
zeal in implementing the dictates of Marx. In particular,
this group publically attacked Neto's centralized,
nationally-criented approach to the development of the
Angolan economy. Demanding a decentralized economic and
politic system based upon goder
.ESEUiiil* they assailed the
party for awarding governmental posts to the whites and
mesticos. [53] The smoldering struggle for leadership
primacy erupted on May 25, 1977 during the abortive Nito
Alves coup. Although the coup generated support only from
the fringes of MPLA ideological opinion, the depth and
breadth of the Alves-forged coalition provides conclusive
evidence of the delicate balancing of international goals
and domestic constraints confronting the Neto regime during
this period. In early March, as the MPLA Central Committee
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met in a stormy session, Nero's problems multiplied.
General Mbumda escaped house arrest and fled to the fron-
tisr. On March 8, 1977, the Kataagan Lunda invaded Zaire.
[54] Several days later, Neto's only sympathetic leader in
the region, Brazzaville's President Marien Ngoubai, was
assassinated. [55]
5. Shaba I: Neto' s Po sitio n
Shaba I provides a marvelous insight into the domi-
nant perceptions of the Angolan foreign policy elite. For
this thesis, the central issue is Neto's position vis-a-vis
the Katangan invasion. Most observers, even those close to
the regime, have attributed the invasion to Neto's decision
to "unleash" the Katangans. Frustrated with Mobutu's
intransigence at the negotiating table, his support of
anti-MPLA insurgent groups, and his integral role in the
Cobra 77 plot, they argus, Neto decided to punish Mobutu.
These observers cite two events to support their conclusion.
One, Castro's March 1977 state visit to Luanda coincided
with the kickoff of the invasion and the announcement of the
reversal of his troop withdrawal policy. Second, Mobutu's
weak internal political and financial condition left him
vulnerable to a Katangan attack. Although they do possess
some validity, these observations presume that Neto welded a
far greater control and influence over events in eastern
Angola than in fact he enjoyed (see endnote 55). In
reality, for three reasons Shaba I shattered the carefully
crafted direction of Angolan foreign policy and was a
disaster for Neto.
First, Shaba I strengthened Mobutu's internal posi-
tion. Instead of destabilizing the Kinshasa regime, the
invasion elicited a surge surge of Western aid both during
and after the "80 Day War" that shocked Luanda. Most
Western intervention came from France which had its designs
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on Cabinda. Even though Mobutu was under strict IMF
observation in March, private foreign creditors announced a
moratorium on debts cf $70 million and then loaned Zaire
another $200 million during the invasion. Not unlike his
pleas for international aid for the FNLA in 1973 and for his
own regime after the Brazzaville summitin 1976, Mobutu
emerged from Shaba I in a stronger position militarily with
French and Belgian support and a receptive international
audience. At a time when Luanda faced a growing threat in
the south, a revitalized Mobutu and unsecure northern
borders were recipes for disaster.
Second, the invasion also endangered Neto's care-
fully orchestrated opening of ties to the West. Although
several West European countries had extended diplomatic
recognition to the MPLA, most perceived the MPLA as being
foreign dominated and questioned Luanda^ internal legiti-
macy. Neto, therefore, perceived that any Angolan-initiated
border skirmishes or event that drew international attention
would invaribly invite charges of Cuban, Angolan and even
Soviet complicity. While observars corrsctly point to
Castro*s announcement of the troop reversal mads in Luanda
coinciding with the Katanga n invasion, the decision in fact
had been in January for different reasons. Alarmed over
increasing Katangan activity (that prompted Mbumda's arrest)
and the revival of the FLEC insurgency, Neto convnced Castro
in January to deploy Cuban troops into the Katangan areas of
eastern Angola and more troops to Cabinda. [56] Under thess
circumstances and with the rising threat from UNITA and
South African, Neto perceived that a continuation of the
Cuban troop withdrawal was impossible. Taken in this light,
not only did the invasion reflectsd Neto's inability to
control events in eastern Angola but also derailed his
attempts to open economic and diplonatic doors to the West.
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Third, as noted above, Neto faced another round of
crippling internal dissension. Serious challenges to his
leadership and to his initiatives rose from both ends of the
party*s political spectrum. The far left was disenchanted
with Neto»s regional detente. The rank and file blacks,
representing the staunchly pro-Marxist, anti-mestico posi-
tion, were equally frustrated with cheir non-particpat ion in
Neto's national policies. Beth groups sought ways to mobi-
lize political support in order to attack Neto's lack of
revolutionary zeal. The groups never coalisced because of
their mutual distrust and hatred. In the bitter factional
struggles that dominate the party in the early of 1977,
Operation Cobra and Zairean machinations had strengthened
the position the regime "hardliners." In this unstable





Whether Neto and the MPLA unleashed the Katangans or
were simply caught off guard, the invasion severely weakened
and complicated the direction of Neto»s foreign policy. By
May 1977, as the Katangans retreated in face of French and
Belgium forces, Neto saw a revitalized Mobutu who had been
able to successfully manipulate the invasion into a rally
for international assistance and to refocus world attention
upon the Cuban presence in Angola. Congo-Brazzaville
President Ngoubai had been assassinated and although the new
government of Yhombi-Opango still expressed an interest in
maintaing relations with Luanda, the new regime was
comprised of individuals long associated with France.
Ethnic animosities stemming from the return of the Katangans
erupted between the Lunda and the Chokwe in the FNLC camps
that were contained only by the forceful intervention of
Cuban troops who cordoned the area. [58] Then, on May 25th,
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the coup attempt by the Nito Alves coalition reflected the
serious internal dissension and fracture within the regime.
The Shaba invasion had not only failed, but it left the Neto
regime severely weakened. Taken together, the events
surrounding Shaba I amounted to a colossal disaster and the
Angolan foreign policy was in shambles.
C. POST INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: THE ROAD TO SHABA II
In the months that immediately followed Shaba I, the
1300 mile Angolan-Zaire border remained calm. Border incur-
sions from Zaire and insurgent activity in Cabinda curtailed
sharply throughout the remainder of 1977. Even though a May
diplomatic attempt by Nigerian Foreign Minister Joesph
Garba, begun in March at 0. S. insistence, to reconcile the
differences between Luanda and Kinshasa ended in failure, by
the end of the year a major improvement in relation seemed
possible. In December, Mobutu sent a message to the 1st MPLA
Congress held in Luanda expressing the hope that the
Congress would "strenghten still further the blood ties
which unite the two peoples." [59] In January 1978, Neto
told a rally in Luanda that "We ace going to improve rela-
tions with Zaire." [60] And in February, the Zairean news
agency reported that Neto had assured Mobutu zhat he did not
plan aggression against Zaire. [51] Nevertheless, while
relation with Zaire seemed on the mend, skirmishes with
ONITA in southern Angola escalated.
1
- IH the South: The Revival of UNIT A
In June, UNITA demonstrated signs of life for the
first time since the 1975-76 civil war. The attacks demon-
strated to Luanda that Savimbi's movement had not been
destroyed in 1976 and represented a potent challenge ot the
MPLA's internal legitimacy. More importantly, UNITA*s
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revival revealed the heavy of South Africa, prompting fears
of another South African intervention. The dynamics of the
south will be discussed at length ia Chapter 2.
2- In the East: The R evival of the Katangans
In eastern Angola, the MPLA once again was buffeted
by the centrifugal and centripedal forces emanating from
Zaire. Following their inept performance during Shaba I r
the Zairois armed forces and Provincial security forces were
extensively and brutually purged by Mobutu. Mobutu also
launched a widespread campaign of terror against the Lunda
population who, he claimed, had aided and supported the
FNLC. As a result, nearly 250,300 fled into Angola and
swelledGeneral Mbumda's recruiting ranks. The fleeing Lunda
also exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region. Reportedly,
Mobutu also attempted to purge the Belgian and pro-Belgian
Zairois officials of the state owned Unicn Minere cobalt
firm, whose plants were left untouched by the FNLC. [62]
Though Mobutu 1 s anti-Belgian efforts were largely unsuc-
cessful, the harassed Belgians swelled the financial coffers
of Mbumda. [63] Additionally, in the weeks after the return
of the Katangans, Cuban troops were withdrawn from the FNLC
camps and East German advisors were sent in to train the
FNLC forces. Both Neto and Castro objected but were over-
ruled by the Soviet Onion. [64] Ia the period between May
1977 and May 1978, Mbumda reconsolidated his supremacy over
the anti-Mobutu groups. Meanwhile, Neto, without any link
to Mbumda, exercised little or no control over the affairs
and activities of the FNLC.
3. Reasses sme nt of Its Foreign Policy
In the fall of 1977, and then in conjunction with
the MPLA's 1st Ordinary Congress in December, Neto and his
closest advisors undertook a funiamental reassessment of
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Angolans position in domestic, regional, and international
affairs. While there are a number of factors that precipi-
tated this reassessment, several ars particulary important-
First, UNITA insurgent activity widened into the central
provinces after the FflLPA/Cuban offensive in October. [65]
Second, the Angolan economy had not responded as expected to
the MPLA's socialist initiatives. Neto discerned that the
solution to most of Angola's economic problems lay beyond
the range of Cuban abilities and could only be found in such
endeavors as the introduction of nore private enterprise,
expansion of contacts with multinationals, and soliciting
the return of the Portuguese. Third, Neto perceived that
although the Soviets were necessary friends, they were not
willing partners in regional affairs. By this time, Neto
had been able to discern the boundaries of Soviet willing-
ness to support Angolan interests. It was clear that many
interests were not only outside the limits of Soviet support
but often incongruent with Soviets designs in southern
Africa. Each of these factors necessitated a rapprochement
with Zaire and an active participation in the negotiations
for the independence of Namibia. A rapproachment with Zaire
and a solution in Namibia would not only achieve a secure
borders enabling the regime to shift military forces south.
This would also permit the revitalization of the economy by
shifting the focus from national defense to economic devel-
opment. Additionally, secure borders would also serve as an
imperative for eventual recognition from Western govern-
ments. The reassessment implied, however, a series of
domestic and foreign policy initiatives that would encounter
severe dissent within the ruling elite. The creation of a
vanguard party, the MPLA-PT, at the 1st Ordinary Congress,
designed to centralize power and decision-making with those




Neto did not, however, alter his perception of the
Soviet Union as the ultimate guarantor of Angolan security.
While he pursued policies of detente, opening of ties with
the West, and national reconstruction, he needed the
security of Soviet armaments and Cuban troops. The FAPLA
was not able to defend the borders and conduct counter-
insurgency operations without more training from the Cuban
troops who also served as a deterrsnt against a wider South
African role in southern Angola. The assistance of the
Soviets and Cubans was seen in the two government offensives
during this period, one in October 1977 and the other in
March-April 1978. Interestingly, on one hand, Neto
perceived the Soviet Bloc as the only states willing to
pursue Angolan security interests. While on the other, by
invoking Soviet military assistance Neto could pursue
detente in a position of strength and not alienate his
political left or the Soviets. Certainly, at a time when
the Soviets preferred party-to-party relations internation-
ally, the creation of a vanguard party in Angola also
provided Neto a broader latitude of action without invoking
the ire of the Soviets and his own domestic constitutencies.
Taken together, the reassessment and the resulting implica-
tions became the foundation of Angolan foreign policy at the
outset of 1 978.
**• Foreign Policy Tested
But as 1978 UEfolde d, events along the border with
Zaire and elsewhere in Africa threatened to derail the
initiatives of Angolan foreign policy. Even as Luanda and
Kinshasa exchanged messages of goodwill, the FNLA and FLEC
insurgency had heated up again. In late January, days after
Neto*s public address, FNLA guerrillas attacked the border
villages of Namutenga and Luaokazombo. In February, 43
Angolan Bakongo were massacred at Pangala. The MPLA
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protested the attacks to the ON, citing 20 cross border
raids by Zairois troops. [67] On March 23rd, Luanda claimed
that a Zairois military contingent, backed by Mirage
aircraft and naplam, attacked and burned the Angolan tcwn of
Caianda. [68] Incensed, Neto moved Soviet-made Angolan
gunboats into the Zaire River and threatened -co cut off
Zaire*s only remaining outlet to the sea, the port of
Matadi. [69] The expectation of an improvement in relations
again evaporated as tensions along the border increased.
While the escalation of border skirmishes with Zaire
threatened to damage relations with Zaire, the MPLA was
shocked at the massive intervention of Soviet advsiors and
Cuban troops into Ethiopia. Castro had completed arrange-
ments for a Cuban mission to train the Ethiopian Peopled
Militia in early March 1977 and an advance party of instruc-
tors arrived in early May. After the outbreak of hostili-
ties between Ethiopia and Somalia in mid-July 1977, the
Cuban military mission increased sharply growing to 400 by
November and to 1,000 by late December. By March 1978,
nearly 17,000 Cuban troops 14,000 of whom were combat
troops, had been deployed to Ethiopia. [70] The Cubans in
Angola were not left untouched. In January, two Cuban
armored battalions, an infantry battalion, and a large
number of support troops, approxiaatel y 3,000-5,000, were
deployed from Angola to Ethiopia- [71] The MPLA viewed these
developments with horror. The Cubans were fully integrated
into the security of Angola, responsible for the defense of
the Cabindan oilfields, the Bengeula Railway, and the
training of FAPLA. After the government offensive in
March-April, the Cubans were widely dispersed throughout
Angola. The deployment of Cubans to Ethiopia, though
limited by March 1978, could seriously hamper counter-
insurgency operations at a time of increased guerrillas
activity in the north and the south. Without the guarantee
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of Cuban troops, the backbone of Neto's initiatives
threatened to collaspe.
In the spring, two significant events occured as
Neto's fortunes took a better turn. The seconi government
offensive, launched on February 29th, succeded in cutting
ONITA supply and infiltration routes. The offensive recap-
tured all ONITA-held towns in Cuango Cubango Province and in
the central highlands, towns taken after the previous offen-
sive. Although most observers point to UNITA successes in
ths south as the cause for the offensive, in reality the
circumstances were more complex. Early 1978 was a critical
time for the Namibian independence negotiations. The talks
had entered a sensitive phase after the contact groups
presentation of draft proposals in mid-February, [72] and
Neto was under tremendous pressure from the Soviet Onion and
StfAPO to sabotage them. [73] Then, on May 4th, South African
forces launched a major lightning attack on the main SWAPO
headquarters, training center, and refugee camp at the iron
ore mining town of Kassinga , approximately 158 miles inside
Angola. [74] The ON Security Council, in an emergency
session convened at Angola's request, unanimously condemned
South Africa for the raid an demanded the withdrawal of
South African troops from Namibia. For the first time, the
Security Council warned that future violations could lead to
punitive measures. [75] The attack occured nine days after
South African acceptance of the Western contact groups'
proposals and one day after the Onited Nations concluded a
month-long session on Namibia in which the General Assembly
called for the unconditional South African withdrawal from
Namibia. [76] For Neto, these two events signaled a distinct
shift in his fortunes. Not only had ONITA forces been
ravaged, but also world attention had finally focused upon
South Africa. His good fortunes, however, did not last.
Just one week after the Kassinga raid, the FNLC launched




Unlike the ill- conceived Shaba I incursion in which both
sides shadow-boxed for 80 days, Shaba II was an extraordi-
nary well planned and executed operation. Knowing that the
Zairois army had fortified their previous invasion route in
western Zaire, the FNLC invaded from the south through the
Cazambo Salient of Angola and Zambia. Success for Mubumda's
forces came quickly. Kolwezi fell on May 13, a feat the
FNLC failed to achieve a year earlier. Tha towns of
Mutshatsha, Mungulunga, Kaiango, and Kakopacn fell on the
14th. The FNLC attacked all key points simultaneously thus
making it impossible for Zaire to shift its forces and rein-
force key areas. Onlike their first invasion, the FNLC
received almost total support from the local population,
stemming from the heinous activities of the Zairois army and
tha Mobutu purges after Shaba I. But the FNLC advance
stalled on the 16th at a hydroelectric plant near N*Zilo
when Mbumda*s forces encountered UNITA partisans. [77] The
tide quickly turned with a consiierably stronger and more
immediate response from the West than in Shaba I. On May 16
and 17, French and Belgium paratroopers were dropped into
Kolwezi. By the 19th, the FNLC had been routed and forced
to retreat into Angola.
The role of the Angolan government and other external
actors, particularly the Soviets, Cubans, and the East
Germans, in the Shaba II affair has been a hotly debated
issue. Though a detailed look at the role of these actors
is beyond the scope of this thesis, a general appraisal does
lend insight into understanding the response of Neto
following the return of the Katangans. First, observers
point to Moscow^ massive cobalt purchase on the interna-
tional market on the eve of the invasion as evidence of
Soviet complicity. Interestingly, Zairean cobalt production
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increased 30% in 1978, from 10,200 metric tons in 1977 to
13,300 metric tons in 1978, whils copper production fell
60,000 metric tons during the same period. [78] Although
cobalt prices zoomed from $5 to $60 per pound in 1978, it
seems ironic that the West would accuse the Soviets of being
better capitalists than anyone else. Cuban complicity,
stemming from charges mads by the Carter Administration in
late May and early June, is also cited. At the time,
Castro's forces, many of them posted in Angola, were
involved in a massive air and sea lift to Ethiopia at the
height of the Somalian invasion of the Ogaden dssert. The
Cuban troops remaining in Angola were widely dispersed in
the southeastarn provinces after the governmentof fensive in
March-April. Interestingly, it that Castro learned in early
April of a possible FNLC attack and tried to warn the
Angolans. [79] Castro's quick, and unusually vehement
denials, the overextended position of the Cuban military,
and his opposition tc training of the FNLC after Shaba I
raise serious doubts of Cuban instigation or support of the
Katangans- On the ether hand, there is some evidence to
suggest that the East Germans wers involved. East Germans
advisors, perhaps as many as 100, were stationed at three
Angolan military bases in eastern Angola: Luso, Texeira de
Sousa, and Henrique de Carvalho. The GDR Defense Minister,
General Heinz Hoffman, was in eastern Angola and visited the
three military bases en the eve of the invasion. Seasoned
African analyst Colin Legum, writing in The Observer on May
21, 1978, suggested that the East Gsrmans had been allocated
on behalf of the Warsaw Pact countries the role of destabi-
lizing the Mobutu regime. Furthermore, the East Germans had
provided arms, training, vehicles and fuel to tha FNLC. [80]
Despite these allegations, the East German presence was
minimal and inconsequential. While there can be little
doubt that the FNLC had in some fashion benefited from the
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presence of Soviet bloc forces in Angola, there is no
conclusive evidence to support the contention that any of
these actors abetted the invasion.
Likewise, Angolan complicity is difficult to perceive.
First, the continuing legacy of the Neto/Mbumda relationship
had primarily penalized the Angolans. Shaba I had served to
complicate Angolan regional relations and generated the fear
in Luanda of Mbumda's political and ideological indepen-
dency. Second, the Western commitment to the Mobutu regime
had strengthened those within the Angolan elite who criti-
cized detente with Zaire and other Neto foreign policies.
Although the creation of the MPLA-PT centralized decision-
making, most Central Committee and Politburo members were
military officers who, though somewhat loyal to Neto, gues-
tioned the credibility of any agreement with Mobutu. Third,
during April 1-19, Neto was in Moscow for cancer treatment.
[81 ] It was during this period that Castro reportedly
informed Luanda of an impending Katangan attack. As is the
case in most third world countries, without Neto in Luanda
the MPLA forfeited any hope of restraining Mbumda. Fourth,
as Shaba I so amply demonstrated, another Katangan invasion
again provided the pretext for Western intervention.
Another Western response would not only refortify Mobutu at
a time when the MPLA faced a growing insurgency in the south
but alsc would jeopardize the prospect of expanding and
broadening ties with the West. Lastly, the Cassinga raid
had finally directed world attention at South African pres-
ence in Namibia and its iestabilization efforts throughout
southern Africa. A Shaba II would certainly eclipse the
world reaction to the raid. Therefore, from an Angolan
perspective, support for or acguiensce to an invasion into
Zaire was not in the MPLA's interests. In the history of
MPLA-Zaire relation, a direct confrontation with Kinshasa
usually had profound negative implications upon the internal
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stability and foreign policy initiatives of the' MPLA, and
thus was to be avoided.
In reality, the FNLC did not require the benefits of a
Soviet bloc presence in Angola. The deterioration in the
Zairean economy, rampant political corruption throught
Zaire, the depredations unleashed by Mobutu in the wake of
Shaba I, and the volatility of 250,000 Lun da refugees in
Angola provided the FNLC with ample reason andlocal sympathy
for the rebellion. All of these facts considered, Soviet
bloc assistance to the FNLC was a moot issue. For the
Angolans, Shaba II cnce again exhibited the lack of Luandan
administrates control within its own borders and seriously
threatened to derail the December 1977 initiatives of its
foreign policy. Neto, therefore, perceived that he had to
act quickly before events precipitated another disaster.
As the routed forces of General Mbumda retreated back
into Angola, Neto went on the offensive. First, he
dispatched units of the Angolan army and disarmed the
Katangans and confiscated their vehicles. Then he initiated
measures to begin the herculean task of resettling them in
the vicinity of Silva Porto (now known as Bie) , nearly 400
miles from the Zaire border. Second, upon their return to
Angola, General Mbumda and Antoine Sizenga were arrested and
taken to Luanda. A few weeks later, in mid-June, Mbumda
agreed, at Neto»s insistence, to propose a reconciliation
between the FNLC and Mobutu. [82] Third, in a Revolutionary
Council statement issued on May 27th, Neto vehemently denied
Angolan complicity, stating "In no way did Angola take part
in the recent events in Shaba." [83] Then on June 10th, in a
radio address broadcast over Radio Luanda, Neto again denied
Angolan involvement. But he also held out an olive branch
to Mobutu, saying "He hope to ally the apprehensions of the
Zaire government ... Good relations between Angola and Zaire
are necessary for the peace and development of this part of
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Africa." [84] Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Neto
sent a personal message through Angola's ambassador to the
ON, Elisio de Figueiredo, to President Carter expressing
adesire for a reconciliation with Zaire and better relations
with the U.S. [85] The message, received in the second week
of June, reflected the abrupt shift in the 0. S. position on
Shaba II. President Carter, in his June 14th press confer-
ence, signalled the shift when he indicated that the U.S.
"never considered" supporting a pan-African strike force.
[86] On June 20th, in a speech in Atlantic City, Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance reinforced the new direction when he
stated that the U.S. intended to work "in more normal ways"
with the government of Angola. " 87 ] Less than 24 hours
later. Deputy UN Ambassador, and significantly the chairman
of the UN Contact Group, Donald McHenry was dispatched to
Luanda. Neto*s actions clearly exceeded the limits of
previous Angolan behavior, particularly after Shaba I. Not
only had he taken extraordinary steps to extend the olive
branch to Mobutu, Neto also had secretly invoked the inter-
vention of the United States. In the process, Neto expended
considerable political capital and was in an untenable
domestic position unless his actions bore fruit.
Although both Shaba I and II had created the nearly
identical recipes for disaster, Neto perceived that he
finally had Hobutu on the ropes. Neto's superior position
was reflected during the U.S. mediated reconciliation
between Luanda and Kinshasa. [88] The U.S. delegation, led
by Ambassador McHenry, went to Luanda twice, June 21-24 and
again on July 10-12. Though other MPLA officials attended,
the principal Angolan negotiators were Neto, Defense
Minister Henrique "Iko" Carreira, and Neto»s personal aide.
[89] At the table, Neto demanded three concessions from
Mobutu: the movement of Zairean Bakongo from the border
areas, the expulsion from Zaire of Holden Roberto, and the
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closure of the Kamina airstrip used to resupply UNITA. The
demands were significant in that Nsto utilized the McHenry
dslegation to extract concessions from Mobutu that he had
not been able to achieve bi-laterally. The U.S. delegation,
in turn, promised to "deliver" Sobutu and to block his
threatened retaliation of supplying the FNLA and FLEC.
Additionally, the U.S. asked for Neto's support in the
Western Contact Groups proposals, particularly with SWAPO.
The delegation noted that Neto appeared to have an uncon-
strained hand during the negotiations, that he possessed a
consensus within the elite for reconciliation, and that he
had a strong desire to expand Angolan cooperation with the
U.S. to other areas cf mutual interest, specifically in its
links with SWAPO.
At this point, it is interesting to speculate about
Neto's motives for invoking the United States to broker a
reconciliation with Zaire. One, Neto clearly perceived the
U.S. as the only external state who could exert sufficient
influence in order to "deliver" Mobutu. Neto, with good
reason, saw Mobutu as weak, corrupt, untrustworthy; an unre-
liable leader who would only respond to one of his friends.
Second, Neto was not uncomfortable with the U.S. negotiators
nor the prevailing diplomatic climate. Neto had received
regular briefings by McHenry sines the formation of the
Contact Group in February 1977. President Carter's press
conference and the Vance speech served as confidence
building measures that reinforced Neto's perception of the
U.S. as a credible mediator. Third, Neto also foresaw the
value of a Namibian settlement. Active U.S. involvement in
the pursuit of Namibian independence coincided with Angolan
interests. Fourth, the U.S., in turn, was unwilling to
invoke any preconditions for their participation. Both the
Ford and Carter administrations had refused to recognized
Angola, officially, because of the presence of the Cuban
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troops. The continued presence ani activities of the UNITA
partisans posed problems for Luanda and Neto was in no posi-
tion domestically to agree to such a £uid pjro juo precondi-
tion. Lastly, Neto saw reconciliation with Mobutu as a
prerequisite for eventual ties with and recognition from the
West, particularly the United States. In each of these
instances, U.S. and Angolan interests coincided. Although
the U.S. delegation noted an elite consensus for a reconcil-
iation, Neto was under severe pressure to achieve a tangible
and substantive agreement. Only such an agreement could
satisfy his political left and ensire that the Soviets and
the socialist community would continue to support his
regime. Given the complexity and the gravity of the stakes
for Neto, invoicing the United States to effect an
Angolan-Zaire rapprochement was nothing less than a
brilliant maneuver.
E. RAPPROCHEMENT
Ironically, Shaba II created both the environment and
incentives for a more permanent reconciliation between
Angola and Zaire. After the McHenry mission, the steps to
rapproachment progressed rapidly. On July 17th, delegations
from both sides met in Brazzaville and agreed to settle
several long-standing differences. Three days later, at the
OAU Summit in Khartoum, Neto and Mobutu met secretly in
talks arranged by the Belgian Foreign Minister and Guinean
President Seko Toure. Then, on July 30th, both governments
announced that diplomatic relations had been established.
The normalization of relations included an agreement on
three points: the repatriation of refugees, there opening
of the Benguela Railway, and the creation of a Control
Commission under OAU auspices to monitor any military devel-
opments along the Angolan-Zaire border. [90] By early
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August, diplomatic representatives took -cheir posts. Neto
visited Kinshasa on August 19-21 and Mobutu visited Luanda
on October 15th. At the end of the latter's visit, the two
Presidents signed an agreement to disarm and relocate the
BaJcongo and Katangan rebels. Later in the year, confident
the arrangements with Mobutu would hold, Neto granted a
general amnesty to all FNLA and FL2C rebels. The long and
arduous cycle of violence along the 1300 mile border had
ended,. The rapprochement permitted Neto to turn his atten-
tion to the more serious problems in the south.
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HI. THE HPLA IN THE SOOTH: EVOLUTION OF TWO^TRACK STHATEGI
In the years since their rapproachment, Angolan-Zairean
relations have warmed as the instability and tensions along
their common borders has eased. Cross border commerce and
migration have replaced raids and troops. To the south,
meanwhile, the MPLA has become embroiled in another and
more serious interstate conflict. Simmering since the 1974
Portuguese coup and left unattended by the newly independent:
regime in Luanda, the conflict has mushroomed into direct
challenge to the survival of the MPLA. Similar to its
conflict with Zaire, the MPLA faces an external, though more
potent, destabilizing force: SDuth Africa. Numbering
nearly 4,000 men South African Defense Forces today occupy a
100 mile salient of southern Angola. Unlike its struggle
with Zaire, however, the MPLA encounters a rejeunvated and
expanded UNITA insurgency. ONITA today conducts regular
insurgent operations with impunity in 14 of the country's 16
provinces, most recently in the Bsngo region ninety miles
northwest of Luanda. Additionally, SWAPO (the South West
Africa People's Organization), who aligned with the MPLA in
1976, has become a greater liability than an asset in a
region where the MPLA has no ethnio allies. Cumulatively,
the conflict, stemming from the dynamics of these forces and
the resultant pressures imposed upon Luanda, comprises the
MPLA's southern problem.
To solve its southern problem, the MPLA has pursued a
two-track strategy: one of resistance and the ether of
negotiation. In the strategy of resistance, the MPLA has
sought not only to counter militarily the advances of the
South African and UNITA forces but also to attract the
myriad of ethnic groups into the regime's political
53

consolidation process through internal stability and
economic development. This strategy has yielded few rewards.
The deployment of the approximately 20 r 000 Cuban troops and
its own army (FAPLA) in the south has instead contributed to
widespread instability and economic chaos. In the process,
the MPLA has exacerbated regional ethnic tensions and
considerably aided the internal legitimacy of UNITA. The
MPLA's second strategy, one of negotiation, has invoked a
diplomatic resolution. In particular, the MPLA has partici-
pated in the mulit- lateral negotiations under the auspices
of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia and in
bi-lateral talks with South Africa. This strategy, which
complements rather than substitutes for the initial
strategy, has also borne little fruit. Principally, both
the UN and bi-lateral negotiations have reached an impasse.
As a result, the weak and fragmented MPLA is confronted with
a unique foreign policy dilemma that generates enormous
internal pressures.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the evolution
and the objectives of the MPLA 1 s two-track strategy and the
underlying southern political and ethnic mosiac affecting
the strategy. Additionally, this chapter will evaluate the
internal regime dynamics while balancing the two strategies
from 1975 until 1979.
A. ETHNIC AND POLITICAL MOSAIC OF SOUTHERN ANGOLA
Although most international attention focused upon the
events in the north, the 1974 Portuguese coup and subsequent
announcement in Lisbon of independence for all Portuguese
colonies equally affected the political and ethnic dynamics
of southern Angola. Many old alliances crumbled in the wake
of new realities posed by the prospect of independence. The
principal actors in the south, the MPLA and UNITA,
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scrambled, jockeyed, and often waged pitched battles for
southern supremacy. [91] Meanwhile, the Portuguese colonial
administration attempted to create the incentives and
climate for a multiparty po st- independence government. The
centrifugal forces generated by the Angolan conflict soon
entangled the sideline actors South Africa and SWAPO. An
evaluation of the prevailing political and ethnic dynamics
in southern Angola provides a useful framework for an anal-
ysis of the evolution of the MPLA's southern strategy.
1. The Scramble for Independence, January- November 1 975
The year 1975 began with immense hope for a peaceful
transition to independence for Angola. In an attempt to
lend legitimacy to the transition to Angolan independence,
on January 15th, in the Portuguese Mediterranean resort
village of Alvor, representatives of each liberation move-
ment and the Portuguese government hammered out and signed
an agreement establishing a framework for independence under
the auspices of the Alvor accords. The accords proclaimed
November 11, 1975 as the date of independence, mandated
legislative elections during the eleven month transition
period, and established a common national army. [92]
Portuguese officials hoped the terms of the agreement would
place a premium on the political process, on coalition
building and on trans-ethnical alliances. Distrust among
the Angolan participants, however, had only been partially
muted. As a result, implemenatation of the accords proved
exceedingly difficult. The FNLA, in the strongest military
position and perceived to have the inside track to power in
Luanda, was reluctant to fully participate in the coalition.
To counter the FNLA f s dominance, Portuguese colonial offi-
cials, particularly High Commissioner Almirante Rosa
Coutinho, sought to balance the relative military strengths
and internal positions of the competing national liberation
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movements. In the months following Alvor, most Portuguese
diplomatic arm-twisting focused on the MPLA and UNITA. In
part icular, Coutinho resumed arms shipments to UNITA and
assiduously pressed for an MPLA-UNITA merger. [93] The
agreement, however, never held. Pitched battles in the
Luandan musseques between rival MPLA and FNLA forces in
February and March, however, signalled the collaspe of the
Mvor accords. On August 29th, the Portuguese formally
annulled the Alvor accords, dissolved the dsfunct tran-
sitional government, and then withdrew the bulk of its colo-
nial army. The race for independence dramatically
accelerated. For the MPLA and tha FNLA, the accords served
as an interfarence in their pursuit for power. In the
south, however, the collaspe of tha Alvor accords generated
a profound impact upon the most vulnerable actors: UNITA
and SWAPO.
2. UNITA
For UNITA, the Portuguese coup and the Alvor Accords
presently exactly the political opening for which Jonas
Savimbi and his cclleaugues had long hoped. Situated
hundred of miles from Luanda, UNITA was, however, in an
extraordinarily impotent political and military position and
thus unable to capitalize on its good fortunes. Savimbi,
tharefore, counted on the arm-twisting of Almirante Coutinho
and exploitation of UNITA*s advantage, its political strong-
hold of more than two million Ovimbundu in the central high-
lands, to provide him a share of the new government. By
May, however, as it became evidant that power in Angola
would be taken by a force of arms rather than in a coalition
goverment, a sense of desparation seized the UNITA leader-
ship. Savimbi not only perceived that his strategy had
collasped but that international and domestic support for
his fledging movement had also eroded.
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To adequately discern the complexities of the
southern Angolan mosaic, it is necessary to evaluate the
principle factors contributing to the erosion of UNITA's
position in 1975- Internally, Savimbi^s carefully and
crafted coalition of the three principal southern and
central ethnic groups, the Ovimbundu, Ngangela, and the
Chokwe/Lczi, was unravelling. Until 1975, Savimbi had
skillfully and successfully exploited the prevailing themes
of anti-Portuguese colonialism and anti-mestico ethnic
animosities to forge and subsequently rally support for his
liberation movement. [94] As 0NITA f 5 fortunes faded with the
collaspe of the Alvor Accords aid Almirante Coutinho*s
endeavors, the traditional hatred stemming from the 19th
century Ovimbundu dominance in the Angolan center and south
erupted into severe infighting. Furthermore, the deteriora-
tion of ONITA coalition suffered from the machinations of
Daniel Chipenda, a Chokwe and long-time Savimbi rival.
Chipenda, who defected in 1973 from his post as the MPLA 1 s
Eastern Region Commander to joing the FNLA, began to mobi-
lize support among the Chokwe community for the FNLA. He
adroitly exploited the inherent ethnic animosities between
the Ngangela and the Chokwe in UNITA*s traditionally weak
areas of eastern Angela. [95] Moreover, in May and again in
July, he secretly travelled to Namibia in order to seek
military assistance from South Africa against the MPLA.
Chipenda's clandestine missions sparked serious alarm in the
ONITA leadership. His strength and popularity among the
Chokwe and his recruitment forays into the south threatened
to split further Savimbi's fragile coalition. More impor-
tantly, Savimbi feared if the South Africans rallied to the
FNLA's side, a victorious Chipenda would then unleash his
powerful army upon ONITA 1 s Ngangela partisans. A third
factor contributing to 0NlTA«s deterioration was a rapid
escalation of MPLA military and political strength in the
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south. By May 1975 , MPLA partisans had extended its influ-
ence and position into the major cities and towns in the
cental highlands and around the Cunene installation along
the Namibiar. border. Additionally, MPLA military forces
inflicted heavy losses upon ONITA guerrillas in pitched
battles near the Cunene complex. In the succeeding months,
the MPLA drove Savimbi loyalists out of Lobito, Benguela,
Mocamedes, Sa de Baneira, and Perceira d»Eca. The deterio-
ration of Savimbi's internal position crippled his
bargaining leverage, undermined his strategy and seriously
complicated his negotiations with the Portuguese and the
MPLA.
The weakening of Savimbi's coalition movement also
corresponded with decline in external assistance. By May,
support to ONITA from outside sources had been reduced to a
trickle. Perhaps most seriously, Tanzanian President Julius
Nyerere, conforming to the intent of the Alvor agreement,
refused to permit the transshipment of arms to ONITA. [96]
Only a modicum of Chinese arms funneled into Angola by
Zambian President Kenneth Kuanda and by SWAPO farces reached
ONITA partisans. Moreover, as tha Angolan conflict became
internationalized by mid-1975, only ONITA forces had not
benefited froi a heavy input of outside military training
and arms. [97] Savimbi had hastily mustered an army roughly
estimated at 20,000 men, but his partisans were handicapped
from a lack of training, organizational coherence, and
discipline. The shortage of weapons to carry the strugge
against the better armed and trailed MPLA further exacer-
bated ONITA's woes. A second external factor was the
increasing belligerency of South Africa. Equally alarmed by
the events in Angola which threatened its cozy security
relationship in Namibia, the South Africa forces launched a
series of border incursions into southern Angola. Their
attacks were aimed not only at the newly repositioned SWAPO
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forces but also at MPLA and UNITA positions. The South
African activities, together with Chipenda's clandestines
missions, greatly worried UNITA officials. Moreover,
Savimbi feared the creation of a South African-inspired
greater Ovambo state under its own aegis, an entity that
would revive the historical Ovambo-Dvimbundu animosities and
exacerbate the ethnic fragility of the UNITA coalition.
In desperation Savimbi moved to shore up his
collasping postion by mobilizing support on the political
battlefield. In June 1975, he agreed to assist in the
permanment movement and resettlement of SWAPO forces from
Zambia into UNITA camps and territory in southern Angola
thereby establishing a more formal alliance with SWAPO. [98]
Previously, although the two movement shared close ethnic
ties, UNITA had assisted SWAPO only in the infrequemant
passage of PLAN forces through the south to the Namibian
border (for a fuller discussion, see pp. 61-3 below).
Savimbi perceived that a stronger alliance with SWAPO would
enhance his political strength and internal position in the
south against the MFLA. Then, following the August 22nd
South African incursion at Percera d'Eca (now N'giva),
Savimbi launched a peace initiative with the MPLA. Using
Portuguese intermediaries, in particular the Antunes faction
of the Portuguese Armes Forces Movement, Savimbi revived the
Ccutinho proposal by seeking an MPLA-UNITA coalition govern-
ment that excluded Holden Roberto. [99] Following talks
between the MPLA's Lopo do Nascimento and UNITA's Jose
N'dele held in Lisbon on August 27-29th, Neto initially
exhibited interest in a two-party alliance. By the end of
September, however, lacking a fin response from Neto and
fearing a manifestation of Chipenda 1 s ties to South Africa,
Savimbi dropped the proposal. Reportedly, the United States
also interceded and dissuaded Savimbi from pursuing such an
accord. [100] The failure to reach an accord with the MPLA
fatally doomed Savimbi's prospects for power.
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In late September, with independence imminent,
Savimbi turned to to South Africa for protection. He paid a
grevious price, however. The South Africans provided a
buffer against a further decline in UNITA's position and as
well as arms and supplies. As a qui d pro guo for South
African help, Savimbi renounced UNITA 1 s ties with SWAPO and
agreed to provide the South Africans intelligence on the
locations and strength of SWAPO guerrilla camps. [101] As a
conseguence, Savimbi*s separate pact with South Africa
transformed the Namibian nationalists of SWAPO from adver-
saries of the MPLA to adversaries of UNITA. Throughout its
history, suffering from a chronic disadvantage in external
aid, UNITA had often oscillated between resource political
self-reliance and desperate expediencies. Savimbi 1 s polit-
ical dexterity in his arrangement with the Portuguese,
Holden Roberto, and then the South Africans, permitted UNITA
to survive. As a result, however, the ethnic and political
mosaic of southern Angola was radically altered.
3. SWAPO
The turbulent events following the Portuguese coup
also affected and immensly interested SWAPO. Until 197U
anti-insurgent cooperation between the military and intelli-
gence services of South Africa and the Portuguese colonial
administration in Angola border had relegated SWAPO»s mili-
tary and political wings to the desolate Baroste Province of
southwestern Zambia. Situated hundreds of miles from its
ethnopopulis- support, SWAPO was never able to generate
serious political strength nor a challenge to the South
African administration in Namibia. Instead, its infrequent
insurgent forays focused on the unpopulated and barren
Caprivi Strip of northeastern Namibia. Without a major
external supporter, SWAPO was largely a feeble and impotent
force in the Namibian struggle and in the ethnic mosaic of
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southern Angola. The Portuguese coup and the Alvor accords
provided an opening that dramatically improved SWAPO ( s
fortunes. A3 a consequence, however, it also forced SWAPO
officials to take sides in the Angolan conflict.
With the MPLA prior to 197!*, SWAPO had little
contact. Operationally, SWAPO partisans at times encoun-
tered MPLA forces while in transit to Ovamboland. In
1969-1970, SWAPO collaborated with the MPLA eastern front
political leaders in the Huila and Cuando Cubango Provinces
in order to ensure ccntinusd access to the Namibian border.
When the MPLA attempted to extend its position among the
Angolan Ovambo, however, acute ethnic warfare erupted and
all SWAPO-MPLA cooperation ceased. [102] Politically, in the
late 1960s, SWAPO joined the alliance of the four socialist
anti-Portuguese liberation movements, the CONCP ( Con fer en cia
das Orcanizacoes Nacional ists das Colonias Portugesas)
,
which included the MPLA. [103] Ideologically, the SWAPO
leadership saw that its interests lay within the socialist
community, largely thanks to Sovist willingness to provide
military assistance. But SWAPO officials detested the
MPLA's left-wing multi-racialism which SWAPO viewed as
merely an extension of white rule.
With ONITA, en the other hand, SWAPO shared a broad
"operative alliance." Militarily, UNITA partisans provided
safe passage for SWAPO forces through southern Angola. In
return, SWAPO partisans served as principal conduits of the
ONITA-bound Chinese arms to Savimbi*s guerrillas. Joint
SWAPO-UNITA military operations never occured. Ethnically,
relations were cordial at best. On one hand, the Cuanhama
tribe, the largest of the seven Ovambo ethnic groups, shared
close filial ties with the Ngangela. On the other, however,
the Kwayhama and the Ovambo, together with the Ngangela,
shared an intense hatred for the Ovimbundu, the traditional
ethnic overlords in southern Angola. Politically, their
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interests were mixed. Although SWAPO joined CONCQP largely
to solicit a broader base of external support, pressure from
CONCP and the Soviets failed to prevent SWAPO from
persisting in pragmatic cooperation with UNITA.
Ideologically, their relations were strained. UNITA was
ideologically aligned with SWAPO f s rival organization, SWANU
(South West Africa National Union), a militant Hereo-backed
movement that included members of the Hereo community in
southern Angola. To complicate matters further, UNITA and
SWANU both espoused Maoist rhetoric and were militarily
supported by China. SWAPO, on the other hand, was aided
primarily by the Soviet Union. Althougth many observers
freguently depict a close SWAPO-UNITA friendship during this
period, in reality only geography and limited ethnic loyali-
ties provided a basis for collaboration. Bat after the
Portuguese coup, the SWAPO leadership perceived that its
interests in Namibia more directly coincided with the
southern position of UNITA. Thus, in the scramble for inde-
pendence in Angola, SWAPO cast its lor with Jonas Savimbi.
Another element that affectsd SWAPO 1 s perception of
the Angolan political and ethnic dynamic was its relation-
ship with Zambia. Although the Portuguese coup created new
political opportunities for the SWAPO leadership, the move-
ment found its hands bound and its operations restrained by
Zambian President Kenneth Kuanda. Over the years, SWAPO had
cultivated close relations with ths Barotse Province ethnic
groups who stridently opposed Ruanda's Bemba-based governing
party, the UNIP (the United National Independence Party)
.
After the Portuguese coup, SWAPO military activity in the
Caprivi Strip and the movement of SWAPO forces into ths
Huila plateau generated tremendous alarm in Pretoria. This
led to an dramatic escalation of South African incursions
into Zambia. As a result, a worrisi Kuanda moved to isolate
SWAPO. He curtailed SWAPO military operations, seized most
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of its weapons, and jailed many of its leaders. Zambian
authorities, also concerned with the trend of the Angolan
conflict, diverted Soviet arms shipments from SWAPO to
UNITA. [104] Ruanda's moves further strained SWAPO's
internal fragmentation, particularly between the Ovambos and
the Caprivians. In early 1975, Ruanda intervened with
Zambian troops to prevent rebellious SWAPO factions from a
mutiny. Ruanda's moves also strained SWAPO-UNITA coopera-
tion. Thus, depsite the opening oreated by the withdrawal
of the Portuguese colonial forces, the cumulative effect of
the Zamiban and South African aotions and the internal
political fragmentation had left SWAPO demoralized, poorly
armed, and an enfeebled liberation movements.
4. The MPLA
During liberation struggle, MPLA strategy in the
south focused on the control of tha major urban areas and
key seaports followed by efforts to exert political influ-
ence in the southern ethnic groups. After the coup, the
MPLA's formidable organizational structure quickly estab-
lished control in the important southern cities of Lobito,
Huambo, Benguela, and Mocamedes. Its attempts to build
trans-ethnic alliances failed. Yet, throughout the libera-
tion struggle, the MPLA pursued a pan-Angolaa policy in
large part due to its inferior internal position. With
victory at as independence approached, the MPLA was
unwilling to relinquish its political dominance. It
discarded its strategy of trans-ethnic alliances. In
September, as Neto considered a tactical alliance with
Savimbi, the MPLA elite embarked upon a hardline campaign
against its adversaries, to include UNITA. The MPLA pursued
anti-UNITA initiatives essentially for two reasons. One,
the MPLA perceived UNITA to be solely a military rather than
a political movement and, therefore, without legitimacy.
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Despite encompassing nearly 40% of the Angolan population,
DNITA had failed to mount a serious challenge to the
Portuguese colonial administration. Even the insurgent
activity in eastern Angolan, ONITA's home turf, during the
late 1960s and early 1970s was initiated by MPLA partisans.
Furthermore, Savimbi's acceptance of assistance from the
Portuguese and then from South Africa had convinced the MPLA
elite that DNITA, like the FNLA and FLEC, represented
foreign and not Angolan interests. Second, the MPLA leader-
ship saw DNITA 1 s ethnic base as a potential threat to the
ethnic imbalance within the MPLA. This, in turn, would
endanger the position of the domiaant whites and mesticos
and dilute the party*s authoritarian control of the new
government. Thus, in the months before independence, it
became necessary to undercut both the domestic and interna-
tional support to DNITA. Additionally, Savimbi's feeble
military and political wings made a hardline position more
enticing to the MPLA elite. Taken together, the MPLA viewed
the DNITA as a challenge to its internal legitimacy, a chal-
lenge that also characterized MPLA policy vis-a-vis DNITA
after independence.
5- MPLA-SWAPO Alliance
The political and ethnic balance in the Angolan
south was further altered by the OcDtober 1975 South African
invasion of Angola. For SWAPO, the invasion and Savimbi's
links to South Africa redefined its political realities.
After casting its lot with DNITA, SWAPO officials perceived
themselves to be caught in a diplomatic and military
no-man's land. Similiarly, for tha MPLA, the South African
invasion forced the MPLA to alter its strategy in the south.
Instead of perceiving the south as soley an arena of
internal, ethnic conflict, the invasion added an additional
dimension to the political dynamic. Though the South
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African intervention created common interests, upon Angolan
independence aeither Neto nor Nujoma proposed mutual cooper-
ation. Instead several African laaders, led by Tanzania?.
President Julius Nyerere, who viewed the decoloniztion of
Namibia as the next logical step, convinced Neto to forge an
alliance with SWAPO. In December 1975, they coordinated the
Neto-Nujoma meetings. [ 1 05
]
The proposal of an alliance with SWAPO posed another
dilemma for the MPLA. On one hand, Neto perceived that
political and military ties with SWAPO could shift the
tenuous political balance in the south in favor of the
weaker MPLA while simultaneously exploiting the existing
ethnic animosities caused by the rapture of the SWAPO-UNITA
relationship. Furthermore, the independent MPLA regime did
not have a single southern ethnic ally. Moreover, flushed
with an impressive victory in Angola, Neto saw MPLA support
of SWAPO as critical not only foe the decolonization of
Namibia but also necessary for "revolutionary solidarity" in
southern Africa. On the other hand, many in the MPLA elite,
particulary those in the political left and allies of Neto,
were ideologically fearful of any dilution of party
supremacy. More particularly, many were deeply suspicious
of Nujoma's socialist credentials and of his true ethnic
affinities. [106] Nujoma's radical speeches in early 1976,
though interpreted by some observers to appeal to the
Soviets, were instead intended zo allay the anxieties of the
skeptical MPLA officials. Additionally, the Soviets sweet-
ened the the alliance by offering increased arms shipments
to SWAPO in return for suspension of Chinese assistance.
[107] Neto hoped that a tia to Soviat assistance would tran-
scend the doubts of Nujoma's ethnic loyalities. In the end,
Neto perceived that a politically impotent and militarily
enfeebled SWAPO presented little danger to the Namibian
military balance. The offer to SWAPO, Neto reasoned, would
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not overtly alarm South Africa. [108] In January 1976, Neto
offered to SWAPO the use of Angolan bases for its insurgency
in Namibia and Luanda as SWAPO Headquarters. For the
newly-independent MPLA, the alliance reflected its percep-
tion of the new southern realities and led to a formulation
of a series of initiatives designed to protect its gains in
the south. The alliance also represented the final piece in
the southern Angolan political and sthnic mosaic.
B. THE SOUTHERN INITIATI?ES, 1976
Upon gaining independence in November 1975, the MPLA
immediately focused its foreign policy attention toward
Zaire first and the combined foroes of South Africa and
UNITA second. This secondary role characterized the
regime's external policy throughout its first years. To the
south, the MPLA approached its ovsrall goals of political
consolidation and regional stability with considerable
uncertainity and trepidation. Early in 1976, more as a form
of crisis management than formal deoision-making, the regime
settled on the pursuit of three initiatives each of which
addressed a specific policy objective: the destruction of
ONITA, the ouster of all South African forces, and cultiva-
tion of ties with SWAPO. The initiatives, however, did not
emanate from Luanda as a package. Instead, they were
pursued as distinct and separate entities without harmony or
congruency. and without consideration of the resulting
ramifications. Moreover, they underscored the regime's
fundamental misperception of the complex interrelationships
comprising the southern political and ethnic dynamic.
1.. Silencing UNITA
The collaspe of the FNLA forces in the north and the
withdrawal of South African troops in the south dangerously
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overexposed the internal position of Jonas Saviubi's UNITA.
Capitalizing on this, MPL A forces, with Soviet arms and
Cuban troops, quickly sought to squash the Ovimbundu- based
liberation movement. A series of Cuban- led offensives
routed UNITA partisans from all its previously held terri-
tory, to include the vital provincial capital of Huambo in
the central highlands. By mid-February 1976, the MPLA had
recaptured all major cities, towns and roadways taken during
the South African invasion.
In the face of the MPLA/Cuban onslaught and the
South African withdrawal, the UNITA coalition deteriorated
into open warfare. Severe fighting erupted between UNITA*
s
Ovimbundu army and elements of the Ngangela population along
the Angolan-Zambian border. The demise of the FNLA sparked
fighting between Chipenda's Chokwe army and the Ovimbundu so
severe that UNITA suffered as many crucial reversals to the
Chipenda loyalists as to the MPLA/Cuban forces. In the
northwest, MPLA-backed Lunda tribesmen clashed with Chokwe,
Ovimbundu, and Ngangela partisans. Although some of this
fighting was related to the larger Angolan struggle, most
respresented a settling of old scores. The remainder of
UNITA's disheveled guerrillas flei in disarray into the
sanctuary of a sparsely populated savannah in southeastern
Angola from where they had waged a protracted, small-scale
struggle against the colonial Portuguese.
Diplomatically, the MPLA then sought to sever UNITA
from its external supporters. Following a summit with Neto
in Brazzaville in late February, Zairean President Mobutu
promised to discontinue all aid to UNITA. [109] Severals
weeks before, after a meeting with Savimbi in Kinshasa,
Mobutu announced that he was "neutral" in the Anglan
conflict and would no longer supply UNITA. [113] Neto then
pressured Zambian President Kenneth Kuanda, who had previ-
ously sided with UNITA in the civil war, to adopt publically
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a mere favorable position toward Luanda. At the time,
Kuanda was in an untenuable position. To his west, MPLA
control of the Benguela Railway threatened Zambia's crucial
copper exports. Additionally, thousands of Ngangels refu-
gees escaping Ovimbundu and Chokwe depredations fled into
western Zambia thus posing an increased security threat to
the Bemba-based regime in Lusaka. la the south, the interne-
cine struggle within the SWAPO hierarchy once again threat-
ened to upset the delicate ethnic balance in Bartose
Province. To his east lay the blossoming Rhodesian civil
war. Kuanda, meanwhile, was under increasing pressure from
other southern African states to conform to the position of
the emerging coaliticn of Frontline States. Lacking any
viable alternatives and a loser in the Angolan conflict,
Kuanda capitulated. In March, he ordered the impoundment of
two UNITA aircraft of French origin at Lusaka airport,
banned Zamtian air-space to DNITA and closed the Zambian
border to DNITA partisans. One month later, on April 16th,
Zambia extended diplomatic recognition to theMPLA. Later in
the* year, Kuanda announced the expulsion of all DNITA offi-
cials from his country. [111]
The cumulative efforts of the MPLA were a serious
setback for Savimbi. Only a year sarlier, the Transitional
Government appeared to provide UNITA an avenue to power.
Then in January 1976, Savimbi*s hopes of power in the pest-
indepedent government again soared when the Organization of
African States failed to condemn ths South African interven-
tion in the civil war. Instead, the South African troops
withdrew and Zairean and Zambian support collapsed. DNITA
guerrillas faced the Soviet guns alone. In March, a despa-
rate Savimbi reproposed the MPLA-DNITA coalition. Through
Mobutu, Savimbi asked Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta to
serve as the intermediary. [112] Neto was in no mood for a
reconciliation. Negotiations over the South African troop
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presence in southern Angola had eliminated all MPLA incen-
tives for such an accord. Although Savimbi vowed to wage a
guerrilla war indefinitely, his loyalists were left to fight
with SWAPO partisans for control over the sparse cattle and
water resources in the barren south.
2« Ouster of South African Troops
The complete withdrawal of all South African forces
from Angola was the second critical MPLA objective. In
December 1975, the SADF reached the outskirts of Luanda
until political realities precipitated their withdrawal.
Although irost withdrew into Namibia, approximately
4,000-5,000 South African troops remained thirty miles
inside Angola in a cordon sanitaira around the Cunene River
facility. The intent was obvious: to elicit assurances
from the MPLA for the continued construction of the hydroe-
lectric plant and to polish off the SWAPO camps. [113] The
occupation of the crucial areas worried the MPLA, but it
made no to attack South African positions in the area.
Instead, MPLA officials decided to negotiate through third
parties to secure a South African withdrawal. In mid-March,
the British Foreign Secretary, Jamas Callaghan, and Soviet
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, met in London and shortly
afterwards confirmed to the UN Secretar-General the MPLA's
willingness to permit continued operation. On March 27th,
confident of Luanda's pledge to safeguard the installation
and its anti-SWAPO operations complete, South Africa with-
drew its remaining forces. [114] In early April, an MPLA
delegation, led by Foreign Minister Lopo Nascimento, opened
secret talks with South African Defense Minister Pieter W.
Botha at a site inside Angola to thrash out the details of
an agreement. [115] Cuban troops then assumed the role of
guardian for the facility. Despite the talks, which also
included a prisoner and casualty exchange, tensions along
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the border remained high. Neither government trusted the
other as each expressed fears. South Africaa officials
worried about the MELA-SWAPO alliaace while the MPLA elite
was apprehensive about South Africa 1 s failure to recognize
MPLA sovereignty in Angola.
3 - Cultivating the Alliance
Although it attracted overwhelming pre- and post-
independence support from the urban mestico communities in
the south, the MPLA failed to generated allegiances with any
southern ethnic groups. The MPLA leadership, therefore,
viewed an alliance with SWAPO as crucial in its efforts at
effecting political consolidation and administration in the
areas loyal to DNITA . The MPLA leadership quickly moved to
enforce the ties. Neto agreed to permit the the training of
SWAPO guerrillas at FAPLA bases and the relocation of SWAPO
refugees to MPLA controlled areas. Nujoma established his
headquarters in the Presidential guest house, one of
Luanda*s more posh residences.
Many in the MPLA elite, however, owing to SWAPO
ethnic ties to other southern groups, doubted Nujoma*s revo-
lutionary credentials. In September, Neto tested the alli-
ance by enlisting SWAPO participation in a major MPLA/Cuban
offensive against ONITA positions in Cubango Cuango and
Huila Provinces. PLAN, SWAPO's military wing, provided
intelligence and location on ONITA forces and, reportedly,
led the Cubans to ONITA camps. [116] The operation indicated
a refirement in regime's pursuit of southern initiatives.
But more importantly, it also reflected serious dissent
within the party over Neto* s decision to align with Nujoma.
The operation served an effort by some in the regime to win
support Neto*s position. In the process, Neto formulated a
new and important linkage in the southern initiatives:
continued assistance to SWAPO in its struggle for
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independence in Namibia would be directly tied to its coop-
eration in the MPLA f s anti- ONITA strategy.
SWAPO* s participation in the September offensive,
however, was lukewarm and reflected the severe internal
fragmentation. First, SWAPO 1 s shift in allegiances from
ONITA to the MPLA had generated enormous dissension in many
guarters. la particular, the shift was immensely unpopular
among the Cuanhama, the dominant group within the Ovambo.
They shared strong ethnic affinities with ONITA' s Ngangela.
Moreover, at the outset of the shift, most PLAN forces were
firmly entrenched in ONITA territory and some were colocated
with ONITA partisans. Additionally, there were an estimated
30,000 Ovambo refugees settled in ONITA-held areas. Thus,
any MPLA/Cuban drive against ONITA would seriously endanger
SWAPO supporters. Second, PLAN 1 3 role in the September
offensive sparked another round in the internecine struggle
within SWAPO. At issue was not only the anti-ONITA offen-
sive but also SWAPO 1 s participation in MPLA interests. The
offensive radically split the existing tensions between the
SWAPO hierarchy and its young recruits, between the rival
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, and escalated the
tensions between SWAPO's active forces led by Andreas
Shipanga and the external leadersaip led by Sam Nujoma.
Rebellious factions in the Zambian camps led a mutiny in
late April against Nujoma that required the intervention of
Zambian troops- Shipanga and ten other senior SWAPO offi-
cials were arrested, sent to Dar es Salaam and jailed in
Okongo prison. [117] Internal dissension was further exacer-
bated when, during the offensive, PLAN partisans abducted
142 Cuanhama ONITA sympathizers and excuted 120 of them.
[118] The internal fragmentation seriously constrained
Nujoma«s range of political actions and forced him to adopt
a less pro-MPLA stance. It also signalled to Luanda that




C. THE INITIATIVES UNRAVEL, 1977
As the second year of independence unfolded, the MPLA's
foreign policy concerns continued to be dominated by activi-
ties along the Zairean border and in Cabinda. The regime's
three southern initiatives had become a more formal policy
although no refinement and little attention had been devoted
to the problems and difficulties inherent in the south. As
the year progessed, the southern policy began to unravel.
Among the most crucial factors wsre the revival of ONITA,
the increasing belligerency of South Africa, and the
collaspe of the MPLA-SWAPO alliance. As a result, the
regime suddenly was confronted with a serious problem
without the resources, capability, or coherent policy to
manage it.
1. The Revival of UNIT A
After his humiliating retreat into the Angolan bush
in February 1976, Savimbi carefully reconstituted his coali-
tion. Joined by cadres of young, educated Ovimbundu, and
with his roster of ethnically diverse leaders still intact,
Savimbi organized a renewed rural insurgency. Although he
perceived himself to be ths odd man out, Savimbi pursued a
broad strategy of trying to prcvs the sssentiability of
ONITA participation in the ruling government in Angola.
[119]
In 1977, for the first time since the civil war
UNITA showed signs of life. In June, UNIIA partisans
launched a ssries of major attacks agains- MPLA garrisons
along the Kavango River on the Angolan-Namibian border. The
town of Cuangar, largest in xhe area, fell to ONITA along
with the villages of Calai, Cueli, Fungo, and Cabo de Santa
Haria. [120] * n perhaps the most spectacular incident, an
Angolan transport plane, a Soviat-built Antonov-26 twin
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engine turboprop, was shot down on July 13th over Cuangar in
which 23 men were killed. [ 121 ] In addition, guerrilla raids
on the Bengaela Railway repeatedly disrupted commerce.
ONITA attacks continued to increase in freguency and
severity throughout the year. The focus of the insurgent
activity was in areas of little or no MPLA administrative
control. Comparsions to the Katangans in eastern Angola
generated alarm in Luanda.
As his partisans skirmished with government forces,
Savimbi launched a major diplomatic offensive designed to
win international support for his movement. Despite offi-
cial disclaimers, Zaire and South Africa funneled arms and
equipment into southern Angola. The South Africans stepped
up the training of UNITA guerrillas in SADF bases in
northern Namibia. [122] Following a November 1976 secret
meeting in Dakar, Senegal, between French President Giscard
d*Estaing and ONITA Foreign Minister Jorges Sangumba, France
began to supply UNITA with large infusions of arms both from
Zaire and by direct airlifts from French garrisions in Gabon
and the Central African Empire. [123] At the outset of 1977,
Savimbi admitted to receiving arms from South Africa, China,
Kenya, Zaire, Senegal, and Franoe. [124] In March, in
conjunction with the 4th UNITA Congress held at Sambu in
Huambo Province, UNITA 1 s first such Congress since 1973,
Savimbi announced the formation of a separate southern
Angolan entity: the Rej>ublica Ne^ra Africana e Socialist a
de A ngola (The Black African and Socialist Republic of
Angola). [125]
Although the formation of the "UNITA republic" was
not designed to a seccessionist move, Luanda feared two
possible catastrophic im plica tious for their southern
policy. First, coming on the heals of the revelation of
Cobra 77 and the western response to Shaba I, the MPLA
feared that Savimbi 1 s "republic" might achieve international
73

recognition for UNIT A from several moderate African states,
notably Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Zaire, Sudan, and from
West European governments, perhaps France and Belgium.
Second, and considerably more serious, ONITA's plans gener-
ated concern that South Africa was once again attempting to
create a "Great Ovambo" state under its own aegis that would
unify the Cuanhama speaking communities of northern Namibia
and southern Angola. In August, Ovamboland*s Chief Minister
Pastor Cornelius Ndjcba, appoints! and salaried by South
Africa, accelerated his calls for Ovambo nationalism and for
the creation of an Ovambo Citizen Force. This raised the
possibility of the formation of an Ovambo/UNITA forces
designed to thwart not only MPLA initiatives in the south
but also SWAPO military activity in Namibia. [126] In the
fall, reports of South African trained Ovambo troops
fighting with ONIIA fueled the speculation. [127]
By October, when no public African support for the
"ONITA republic" appeared, Savimbi quietly dropped the plan.
His announcement, however, succeeded in marshalling critical
political and military support for ONITA. The increasing
sophication of ONITA attacks as the year progressed demon-
strated the vitality cf the movement. Reports from Western
journalists traveling with UNITA, in particular the account
of a seven month sojourn by Leon Dash published in the
Washington Post (August 7-13, 1977), heralded the achieve-
ments of ONITA and raised guestions in international circles
concerning the internal legitimacy of the MPLA. The revival
of ONITA did not go unnoticed in Luanda.
2- South African Belli gerence
Despite the negotiated withdrawal of its troops from
Angola in February 1976, South Africa continued to play an
active role in the dynamics of the Angolan south. The South
Africans feared that the relocation of SWAPO guerrillas into
74

areas adjacent to its ethnopopulist support and closer to
Soviet supply lines would, on one hand, embolden the SWAPO
military and, on the other, rejaunvate SWAPO 1 s political
fortunes within Namibia. This would also, in turn, criti-
cally endanger South African political influence and designs
in Namibia as well as its territorial Bantustan policies.
As a result, the South African government under Prime
Minister John Vorster embarked upon an enormous increase in
its military presence and activity in Namibia. Initial
indications of the South African build-up came in December
1976 when the UN Commissioner for Namibia, Sean McBride,
reported that South African troop strength had ballooned
from 12, 800 to nearly 50,000 men over a three month period.
[128] Most ware deployed along tha Angolan border in the
operational zones of Kaololand, Kavango, and Caprivi. In
addition, the trocps increasingly assumed from the
Namibian-based South African Police most of the internal
security functions and patrolling along the Angolan border.
[129] Furthermore, the SADF accelerated its elaborate
efforts to organize, train, and then indigneous military
forces. In July, Ovambo and Kavango battalions were formed
followed by a Bushmen battalion and Rehoboth Baster and Nama
companies. [130] Additionally, South African military offi-
cials strengthened the units composed of Portuguese refu-
gees, fcrmer black Portuguese Angolan troops, elements of
Chipenda's Chokwe army. West European mercenaries, and
Bushmen Scouts, many of whom participated in the South
African interventions into Angola in August and October
1975. [131] Most significantly, tha South Africans undertook
a major effort to dramatically augment and intensify its
assistance to ONITA guerrillas. Enormous amounts of
captured Soviet-made military equipment were given to
Savimbi. ONITA partisans joined other indigneous forces in
insurgent training at Grootf ontein, Namibia. Savimbi^
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forces received logistical assistance such as fuel,
transportation and food from South African installations
along the Angolan border. Finally, beset with a widening
civil war in Rhodesia, South African forces broadened its
cross-border raids against SWAPO and ZAPU (the Zimbabwe
African People's Union, led by Joshua Nkomo) camps in Angola
and Zambia. The raids by Namibian-based South African
forces often were designed to complement UNITA military
objectives.
The increase of South African military presence and
activity along the Angolan border gsnerated tremendous alarm
and paranoia in Luanda. Not only did the MPLA leadership
fear another South African invasion, but the MPLA elite
perceived that its support of SWAPO and now ZAPU provided
the South Africans yet an additional incentive for interven-
tion in the south at a time when most of its forces were
concentrated in the north. The revival of UNITA and South
African belligerency signalled to Luanda that the southern
policy was rapidly unraveling while the regime possessed
little capability to counteract the process.
3. The MPLA^WAPO Alliance Collapses
Although the lukewarm SWAPO cooperation in the
September 1976 offensive signalled the initial cracks in the
MPLA-SWAPO alliance, by mid-1977 Neto realized that his
offer was a colossal mistake. The tension and political
dynamics of the Angolan and Namibian conflicts severely
strained the MPLA's relationship with SWAPO. First, Neto
realized that MPLA and SWAPO interests in the region were
largely incompatible. While the MPLA desired to consolidate
its political gains, destroy the UNITA insurgency and seek
stable borders, SWAPO instead wanted to immediately pursue
confrontation in Namibia. When Neto attempted to restrain
SWAPO^s cross-border incursions, their cooperation waned.
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Second, Neto severely miscalculated the South African
response to the alliance. Originally, Neto perceived that
the feeble and impotent SWAPO posed little danger to South
African interests and to the overall military balance in the
region. By mid-1977, however, MPLA officials saw SW APO
insurgent activity as yet another incentive for continued
South African meddling in Angolan affairs. Third, the MPLA
enjoyed little operational control of PLAN activities or
influence in SWAPO leadership circLes. As the Soviet and
later East Garman rcle in arms resupply and, reportedly,
direct battleground advise for PLAN operations increased,
SWAPO 1 s incentives for cooperation with the MPLA deterio-
rated. [132] Fourth, Neto also perceived Sam Nujoma as an
irascible opportunist. Despite tha strident Marxist tenor
of his speeches, Nujcma repeatedly failed to criticize Jonas
Savimbi or UNITA. On a personal basis, Neto and Nujoma
never established a close friendship. [ 133] Fifth, the MPLA
elite discovered that an alliance with SWAPO did little to
endear the new regime to the southern ethnic groups. The
SWAPO-UNITA rupture failed to earn any new loyalities among
the disenfranchised ethnic groups. As a result, MPLA-SWAPO
alliance generated increased South African interference,
exacerbated the existing ethnic tensions in the region, and
threatened the MPLA*s internal political consolidation
goals. The offer, it became painfully obvious to Neto, had
backfired. Distrust and hatred Df SWAPO and Sam Nujoma
spread from the rank and file blacks in the political left
to include most of the MPLA elite. Unfortunately for Neto,
Luanda was saddled with a perplexing albatross that it could
not easily jettison.
**• Foreign Policy Reas sessment
Alarmed at the deterioration of its overall position
in the south, the MPLA was forced to respond. On July 21,
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1977, Angola protested to the United Nations South Africa's
escalating aggression. In aessage to the UN
Secretary-General, Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge warned that
Angola might call on "friendly states" to help withstand
South African attacks. [134] In October, led by the Cubans,
FAPLA launched another major month-long offensive against
UNITA positions in Cuando Cubango Province and in the wooded
hills of Huambo Province. [135] The offensive marked the
first significant FAPLA action against UNITA in over a year
and, interestingly, did not include SWAPO participation.
Despite these actions, the revival of UNITA and
South African belligerency dealt the MPLA another serious
blow. The turmoil in the south oocured on the heels of the
revelation of Operation Cobra 77 in February, the first
Shaba invasion in March and April, and the Nito Alves coup
attempt in May. The regime's actions in the halls of the
United Nations and on the battlefields of the south
reflected the grave concern in Luanda that its southern
initiatives, along with its other prevailing foreign poli-
cies, had collasped. The leadership, in internal disarray
and still bogged down with the machinations of Mobutu and
Mbunda in the north, lacked the necessary capabilities to
stem the declining tide.
Thus, in the fall of 1977, and implemented at the
MPLA's First Ordinary Congress held in December, Neto and
his closest political allies undertook a fundamental reass-
essment of Angolan domestic and foreign policies (see also
pp. 41-43). The roots of the reassessment lay in the coun-
try's economic collaspe, the severe externally-provoked
instability, the resultant deterioration of its initiatives
in the north and south, and the unsettled nature of rela-
tions among the party's factions and leaders. Domestically,
Neto perceived that the inherent conflict between an
economic and political system based upon £oder popula r
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(decentralized and highly participatory) and one controlled
by a national plan (highly centralized and restrictive in
degree of participation) had in large part spawned the
economic duress and intra-party political fragmentation.
The efforts to reconcile the two ended in ideological and
political confrontations between factions vying for power.
It was the Nito Alves faction, after all, that had gained
control of the organs of po der popular and used it to build
a separate power base from which he challenged the leader-
ship of Neto. Thus, to shore up his internal position, Neto
launched a wide-sweeping purge and rectification campaign in
all national organizations. Then, at the Congress, the MPLA
formally converted itself into a vanguard Marxist-Leninst
"labor party" whose base in the hierarchical structure was
centered upon the 1 1-man Political Bureau loyal to Neto.
[136]
Externally, Neto perceived that the intervention
activities of South Africa and the aushrooming insurgency of
UNITA posed a far greater threat to Angolan security than
that of Zaire. Neto, in conjunction with his internal
efforts, decided to pursue a hardline confrontation against
DNITA who the MPLA believed existed solely upon the graces
of South Africa and who also represented a serious challenge
to the party's reassertion over poder pop ular .
Additionally, in a series of overtures to the West, Neto
embarked upon a cautious international initiative to attract
greater Western assistance for the wobbly Angolan economy.
The overtures also had their political dimensions: Neto
hoped that western participation in the Angolan economy
would induce the erosion of western support to Savimbi and,
in turn, diminish South African incentives for intervention.
Against South Africa, however, Neto had little leverage.
Saddled with the albatross of SWAPO and in 1977 the estab-
lishment of ZAPO" camps, political realities prevented a
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public alteration of the MPLA policy toward South Africa.
Furthermore, the reassessa ment alsD implied the abandoment
of common political goals with Nujomaand the rigid curtail-
ment of SWAPO military activites in Namibia. The domestic
and foreign aspectives taken together, the reassessement and
the resultant initiatives became the foundation of MPLA
policy toward the south at the outset of 1978. In the
process, the three disjointed and antiquiated southern
initiatives had evolved into a mors formal policy ani as a
crucial factor in the MPLA* s overall national strategy.
5. ON Con tact G roup Formed
The final significant event of 1977 to impact upon
the dynamics of the Angolan south was the formation of the
United Nations Contact Group. Eleven years earlier, in
Resolution 2145 adopted in 1966, the United Nations termi-
nated its original "Class C" mandate and asserted direct
responsibility for the independence of South-West Africa
(Namibia.) [137] Since 1966, the UN had repeatedly failed to
engineer the independence of Namibia. In February 1977, the
Western powers of the UN Security Council—Canada, France,
Great Britian, the United States and West Germany--assumed
the role cf the "Ccntact Group," chaired by US Deputy
Ambassador to the UN, Donald F. McHenry, in order to nego-
tiate with South Africa and the doainate Namibian political
parties a transition to independence. The contact group 1 *
basic terms for an international sattlement were formulated
in Security Council Resolution 385. As its strategy estab-
lished as the year progessed, tha group sought to elicit
cooperation from the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) to bring SWAPO, as the
dominate Nambian political party, to an agreement while the
contact group obtained the approval of South Africa. [138]
The contact group toured southern African several times in
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1977 attempting to persuade South Africa and the Frontline
States to join the negotiations. The formation of the
contact group generated little interest in Luanda , however.
The MPLA leadership had not devoted much attention to the
problems in the south and had yet to understand the polit-
ical complexities of the Namibia question. Moreover, the
elite severely mistrusted the Western dominance of the
Contact Group most of whom were aligned against the MPLA
only one year earlier. The absence of the consideration of
the benefits of part icipati ion in the Namibian negotiations
in Neto's December foreign policy reassessment reflected the
failure of the Contact Group to encourage active MPLA coop-
eration with the Frontline States. As 1978 progressed, Neto
perceived that the efforts of the Contact Group were indis-
pensable to tie implementation of his December initiatives.
D- THE SOOTH ERUPTES, 1978
1 • Neto rakes the Init iativ e
In the months following the its First Ordinary
Congress, the MPLA i mplementated its new foreign policy in a
three-pronged effort. The immediate intent was to recapture
the diplomatic and political terraia lost in 1977, solidify
Neto's internal position, and to establish congruency in the
party 1 s foreign policy. First, in March, FAPLA launched a
month-long offensive with the assistance of Cuban and East
German troops and Soviet advisors againt UNITA positions in
Cuando Cubango Province. With five battalions backed by
helicopters, the offensive was the largest yet assembled
against ONITA since the civil war. [139] Interestingly, the
offensive complemented its newly redefined relations with
SWAPO. In order to reduce South African incentives for
intervention in Angola and to achieve greater influence in
SWAPO's leadership circles, NetD had to improve both
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Angola's and SWAPO's security position in the south. Thus,
the offensive was designed not only to crush UNITA
resistance but also to alleviate South African pressure on
SWAPO. At the same time, Neto ordered Nujoraa. to resist.
attacking Soutn African bases in Namibia- [140] Second, Neto
commenced a diplomatic effort to achieve Western European
acceptance of his regime. Utilizing the prospect of
economic investment as the principal attraction, Neto,
through several close personal in termediaries, directed
overtures at France, Portugal, Belgium, and the Scandanavian
countries. Additionally, he initiated talks with the
European Economic Community to seek accreditation to the
Lome Convention and memebership in the group of 57 African,
Carribean, and Pacific (ACP) countries benefiting frcm pref-
erential tariffs and economic assistance. [141] Third, when
the UN Contact Group submitted its initial blueprint for a
Namibian settlement to the Security Council and South Africa
in February 1978, [142] Neto realized that his assumption of
a more active role within the Frontline States and the
Contact Group Strategy was crucial to the success and the
viability of his policy. [143]
In the first few months of 1978, Neto*s initiatives
achieved several notable successes. The anti-JNITA offen-
sive rousted Savimbi's partisans from all the towns and
villages in the southeast and cut his logistical supply
routes to Namibia. The offensive also precipitated a flood
of refugees across the Kavango River into Namibia that
endangered Savimbi*s political support within his fragile
coalition. Neto later claimed that on March 28th FAPLA
forced Jonas Savimbi to flee from the area and was rescued
by a South African helicopter. [144] Then on April 25th,
South African Prime Minister John Vorster announced his
governments acceptance of the Contact Group proposals for a
constitutional settlement in Namibia and the installation of
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a United Nations peacekeeping force. [145] The announcement
came as the ON General Assembly opened a special session on
Namibia and followed several weeks of intense Western pres-
sure on Pretoria. Economically, negotiations began with,
among others, Belgian Petrofina and the French
ELF- Acguitaine over off-shore oil exploration rights and
with Volvo Corporation for the purchase of urban buses.
[146] But perhaps the most spectacular for the MPLA and the
Angolan people was the historic three day summit meeting
held in Guinea-Bissau between Neto and Portuguese President
Antonio Ramalho Eanes. [147] The summit, preceeded by the
accreditation by Portugal of Angola's first Ambassador,
Adriano Sebastiano, signalled a breakthrough in relations
with Portugal and a resolution of the severe rift plaguing
the MPLA and its former metropole. The cumulative effect of
the Neto initiatives appeared to reinvigorate the foreign
policy initiative in favor of the MPLA.
2- Foreign Policy Unravels
As the 1978 unfolded, however, events along Angolan
borders once again threatened to derail Neto*s initiatives.
On May 4th, only eight days after Prime Minister Vorster's
acceptance of the Contact Group proposals, South Africa
launched a major lighting airborne attack on the main SWAPO
headquarters, training center, and refugee camps located
approximately 158 miles inside Angola. [148] The raid,
mounted from bases in South Africa, struck the iron ore
mining town of Cassinga, oode named "Moscow", and simultane-
ously at other SWAPO bases, one of which, Chetequera, was
code named "Vietnam." [149] Over 530 Namibians were slaugh-
tered, including women and children, and nearly 200
captured. The raid was the first significant South African
military operation into Angola since the civil war. The UN
Security Council unanimously condemned South Africa for the
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attack and for the first time threatened punitive measures.
[150] While there can bs little doubt than SWAPO was the
focus of the raid, the operation was also designed to allev-
iate pressure on UNITA. South African officials hoped that
the attack would allow UNIT A time to recover and recoup from
its losses incurred in the March Angolan offensive.
Moreover, the raid occured on the eve of a scheduled meeting
in New York between the Contact Group and Nujoma. [151] For
Neto, the attack dealt a serious blow to his efforts to mold
a congruent policy in the south. It also appeared that the
two weaker and more vulnerable southern actors, UNITA and
SWAPO, were becoming both instruments and victims in an
escalating regional conflict betwsen the more formidable
forces of South Africa and the MPLA. Although Neto clearly
desired to avoid such a conflict, his fortunes further plum-
meted just one week after the Zassinga Raid when the
Katangans launched their second invasion of Shaba Province.
The Cassinga Raid and Neto* s opening to the West
also sparked alarm in Moscow. [152] Despite the MPLA f s
conversion to a vanguard party ani its continued reliance
upon Soviet military assistance, a number of Soviet offi-
cials were clearly wary of Neto initiatives. In general,
the Soviets were openly frustrated and impatient with the
progress and direction of the Angolan revolution. In
particular, the Soviets were dissatisfied with Neto's over-
tures to the West, his restraints on SWAPO, and the lack of
success against UNITA. As a result, the Soviets stepped
pressure on its friends in the MPLA to sabotage the Namibian
negotiations, urging a continued military resolution to the
Namibian conflict. Furthermore, there is evidence to
suggest that Soviet diplomatic personnel in the spring of
1978 opened talks with UNITA 1 s Paris and Dar es Salaam
respresentatives on the conditions necessary for a possible
MPLA/UNITA reconciliation. The Soviets used several
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supporters of Nito Alves and Jose Van Dumen, architects of
the 1977 coup attempt, to render the overture to the MPLA.
Then in June, further complicating the climate, SWAPO dissi-
dent and Nujoma rival Andreas Shipanga was released from a
Tanzanian prison. Immediately upon his arrival in London,
Shipanga held meetings with high-level UNITA and dissident
SWAPO leaders aimed at creating a third Namibian political
party to challenge the strength of SWAPO. There is no
evidence to suggest, however, that neither the Soviet nor
the Shipanga activities occured with the knowledge of either
Neto or Savimbi. The Soviet machiiations, however proble-
matic, underlined the severe pressures imposed upon the
regime and confusion generated by both the Cassinga Raid and
Shaba II- Additionally, to many in the MPLA, it also under-
scored of its inability to exeroise internal political
initiatives without external interference.
3. SWAPO Accepts ON Proposa ls: Neto's Role
Within this political climate, Neto quickly sought
to minimize his losses and resume control of the Angolan
scene. In early June, he sent a secret, personal message to
President Carter through the Angolan Ambassador to the UN,
Elisio de Figueiredo, expressing a desire for a reconcilia-
tion with Zaire and better relations with the Wast. After
several weeks of diplomatic posturing, Ambassador McHenry
was dispatched to Luanda and Kinshasa. During their talks
in Luanda, McHenry proposed to tie U.S. pressure on Mobutu
to Neto's more active participation in the Contact Group
strategy. Neto's quick agreement surprised the Americans.
In reality, Neto was under increasing pressure from several
quarters. First, privately, he elaborately relayed the
Carter message to circumvent the knowledge of the Soviets,
his political left, and evs n his closest political advisers.
Publically, however, to placate his more militant critics.
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Neto talked tough. He announced that reconciliation with
the FNLA and ONITA was impossible and that if Western
countries continued to support groups trying to overthrow
the MPLA, Angola would provide mora "internationalist help"
in Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa. [153] The Cassinga
Raid and Shaba II had overexposed his position and provided
ammunition for those within the regime to challenge Neto's
initiatives. Second was from the Frontline States. In a
summit held in Luanda on June 10-11, 1978, the leaders of
the Frontline States actively soliticed a more direct role
for Neto in the Namibian negotiations. After the Cassinga
Raid, Nujoraa had suspended talks with the Contact Group.
The leaders were concerned that Nujoma lacked any incentive
to return to the bargaining table. Thus, in Luanda, the
leaders, in particular Tanzanian President Nyerere and
Zambian President Kuanda, pressurel Neto to persuade Nujoma
to rejoin the negotiations and to respond constructively to
the South African acceptance of the Contact Group proposals.
Despite the pressure from within his party and from
the Frontline States, Neto in July 1978 was clearly in the
strongest internal position since independence. His bril-
liant maneuvering to elicit rapprochement with Zaire had
muted his more militant critics. Nsto also adroitly manipu-
lated the Frontline State pressure to his political advan-
tage. The pressure afforded the C1PLA a measure of regional
legitimacy and importance, herstofore only grudgingly
conceded, that Neto could use to extract the support from
the "internationalist" segment: of his party. Also, the
pressure afforded Neto the leverage needed to coerce Sam
Nujoma into a more moderate position.
A few weeks later, the Frontline leadars and the
contact group met in Luanda. The intent of the meeting was
to persuade SWAPO to follow South Africa»s lead and approve
the Contact Group proposals. [154] After two days of stormy
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negotiating sessions, Nujoma announced on July 12th SWAPO's
acceptance cf the western proposals for the transition to
independence. Most observers credit Neto as the key player
in the talks. Neto persuaded Nujoma to moderate SWAPO's
insistence of the inclusion of Wal/is Bay in the settlement
agreement. SWAPO's acceptance of ths UN plans marked a major
breakthrough in the negotiations. More importantly, Neto
had regained the initiative in the search for stability in
the south.
4. The December Purge
A few months later, events once again precipitated
the demise of the Neto initiatives. On September 20th, as
he announced his resignation. South African Prime Minister
John Vorster rejected the UN Secretary-General plans for
implementation of Resolution 435. He also announced the
approval of an internal solution to the Namibian issue by
holding elections in December. The announcement was a
devastating blow to the progess of the Namibian negotia-
tions. Two days later, on September 22nd, at a press
conference in Lusaka, SWAPO Vice-President Daniel Muyongo
threatened to walk away from the talks saying that SWAPO
"didn't want to be taken for a ride any longer." [155] South
Africa*s rejection of the implementation plan was followed
by an upsurge in cross border raids and air attacks against
not only SWAPO targets but also against Angolan infrastruc-
ture. In October, SWAPO likewise vetoed the UN plan and
called for greater support from the "socialist states."
[156]
The rejection by Vorster and Pretoria massive
build-up of its forces along the Angolan border sparked
renewed and severe dissension within the MPLA. In partic-
ular, the regime bickered over its response to the South
African move. MPLA Defense Minister, Henrique "Iko"
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Carreira, apparently forced the debate public when he
announced that the South African build-up was a prelude to
an invasion. [ 157] He detailed intensified South African
reconnaissance flights and the enlargement of several
nothern Namibian airfields to talcs Mirage fighters. He
claimed the attack would be an airborne invasion focused on
the cities of Lubango, Huambo, Lobito, and even Luanda
itself. Carreira then, on November 7th, imposed a curfew in
all areas and, for the first time, ordered a general mobili-
zation of the country's militia and defense forces. Some in
the regime saw a similiarity to tha Cobra 77 plans. Others,
though not downplaying the severity of Pretoria's moves, saw
the build-up in different terms. Since the MPLA lacked the
intelligence capabilities to ascertain South African
motives, they perceived the heavy hand of the Soviet Onion
attempting to re-exert influence within certain regime guar-
ters in order to to torpedo the negotiations. The situation
worsened when on November 10th, the day before independence,
two bombs exploded in the busy municipal market in Huambo
killing 40 and injuring 121 people. UNITA claimed
responsbility. [ 158 ]
Against this background, the MPLA Central Committee
met in a stony four day emergency session of the eve of the
party's Ordinary Congress. In a major regime shake-up, on
December 9th Neto dismissed Prime Minister Lope do
Nascimento, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Planning
Carlos Rocha "Dilolwa," and three other deputy ministers.
[159] The two Prime Minister posts were also abolished. At
the time, most observers, including a visiting U.S.
Congressional delegation led by former Senator George
McGovern, saw the dismissals as signifying a reduction of
Soviet and Cuban influence in the MPLA hierarchy. [160]
Nascimento had renegotiated the Angola/Soviet Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty only two months earlier on Ocotber 7th.
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Rocha had signed in late September, without Neto's approval,
an agreement with Cuba to send an additional 6,000
technicians to Angola. In the words of a Portuguese citizen
with close ties to Neto, both were "too close to Havana."
[161 ]
This explanation, however, was far too simplistic.
Instead, the shake-up resulted from, on one hand, disagree-
ment over the direction of Angolan economic policy, and, on
the other, from another direct challenge to Neto's personal
power within the regime. By the end of 1978, after three
years of independence. Angola faced a major economic
crisis. Although hidden by the bonzana of oil revenues and
diamond production, the economy had not responded to the
regime's socialist intiatives. None of the country's
remaining economic sectors had attained pre-independence
production levels. At issue for the HPLA was the twin prob-
lems of declining feed production and the severe lack of
human infrastructure, particularly technicians, supervisors
and those capable of operating the basic industries. As
part of his intiatives formulated a year earlier, Neto
favored a larger role for Western investment and limited
Angolan private 'ownership of of conpanies in the construc-
tion and transportation sectors. Others in the regime,
particularly more ideologically committed blacks and the
hardline mesticos, favored the broader participation of the
socialist community in the development of the Angolan
economy. More importantly, the dismissals were further
evidence of Neto assertion ever £oier PO£ular. The target
of the December purges was the civil service within the
economic ministeries, those appointed to governmental posi-
tions without party membership and without loyalities to
Neto. The purge of Nascimento and Rccha, both longtime Neto
allies, further consolidated Neto's personal position in
what was already a highly centralized presidential system.
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E. THE TWO TRACK STHATEGI, 1979
As Neto erased all sources of lateral opposition, South
Africa conducted elections in Namibia without ON supervision
to form a Constitutent Assembly on December 4-8, 1978.
After secret deliberations with the newly elected "internal"
leaders. South African Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha
informed the UN on December 22nd that the new leaders had
agreed to cooperate with the UN implementation plans. [162]
Then on January 3, 1979, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
announced the resumption of ths UN negotiations. He
dispatched Martti Ahitisaari, than UN Commissioner for
Namibia, to Windhoek to negotiate dates for a cease-fire and
elections. At the end of January, after consultations with
the Contact Group, Botha, and South African
Administrator-General for Namibia, Justice Steyn, Ahitisaari
confidentially predicted the arrival of the UN Transitional
Assistance Group (UNTAG) , a 5,000 men multi-national force
to mcnitor the transition to independence, by the end of
February. A few days later, March 15th was set as the
cease-fire date. [163]
Within a few weeks, however, the brights prospects for
independence appeared on the verge of collaspe.
Difficulties first appeared in January when South Africa
adamantly rejected two key elements of the UN plan: the
provision of SWAPO bases in designated location inside
Namibia as the outset of the ceass-fire and insistence of
UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. [164] Then
on February 13th and 26th, SWAPO guerrillas attacked South
African military bases in northern Namibia with mortar and
artillery fire. [165] The attacks came only a few days
before the scheduled arrival of ths UNTAG. Mutual hosi-
tility and distrust mulitiplied as South Africa retaliated
days later with heavy raids on SWAPO bases in Angola and
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Zambia—the largest since the Cassinga raid. [166] The
climate turned completely sour in late February. After an
Ahitisaari briefing in Luanda with Neto, Nujoma announced
SWAPC^s refusal to accept the estaolishment of SWAPO bases
inside Namibia and the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases in
Angola and Zambia. He also renounced the July 9th accept-
ance of the UN plan and repeated his demand for the total
withdraw of all South African troops before a cease-fire.
[167] In a desparate attempt to keep the UN plan alive, the
Contact Groups acted as intermediaries in "proximity talks"
held in New York in late March. The prospects for a final
outcome in Namibia seem remote.
1« The Stalled Negotiations: Neto [ s Posit ion
SWAPO*s military attacks and rejection of the UN
plan infuriated Neto. Neto believed that Nujoma had balked
only in order to improved his bargaining position against
the proposed merger of SWAPO- D (SWAPO-Democrates formed by
Andreas Shipanga) and the Namibian National Front (NNF, a
non-ethnic based opposition party). Also, he saw Nujoma*s
belligerence as not only impeding the progress of the nego-
tiations at a crucial time but further endangering the
tenuous military balance in the south. Nujoma 1 s rejection
came as the MPLA, in a joint effort with Zambia and Zaire,
undertook new measures to reopen the Benguela railway,
closed since August 1975. UNITA sabotage in the east and
sporadic attacks in the central highlands threatened to
spoil the planned April 1, 1979 dsbut. The resumption of
South African raids once again revived the fortunes of Jonas
Savimbi who feared a Namibian settlement would isolate him
between SWAPO and the MPLA. As a result, together with
Kuanda, Neto ordered Nujoma to resist attacking any South
African bases as long as negotiations proceeded. He also
warned the SWAPO leader that a cease-fire along the
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Angolan-Namibian border would be scrupulously observed.
[168]
The stalled Namibian negotiations also endangered
Neto*s initiatives. First, although most West European
countries had responded to Neto*s overtures, in particular
France in 1978 and West Germany ia 1979 extended recogni-
tion, most countries withheld further investment until a
resolution of the conflict with UNITA and the Namibian ques-
tion. Second, a right-wing baoklash in South Africa
appeared to constrain the position of Prime Minister Botha.
In April, on the heels of the Muliergate scandal and dwin-
dling fortunes of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, South African offi-
cials talked openly of a "Constellation of Southern African
States." Then in early May, the Wiehahn and Riekert
Commission reports, recommending sweeping reform in the
black labor system, were released. The verlighte-verkrampte
rift imposed new pressures upon Botha's position in the
Namibian negotiations. For Neto, this meant the continued
presence of South African troops on his southern border and
South African obstinacy at the bargaining table. The newly
elected Constituency Assembly in Namibia took advantage of
the chaos in Pretoria by announcing its intention of
pursuing an "internal route" to independence. [15 9]
The cumulative effect of these events rendered
Neto's previous southern initiatives obslete. The situation
on the ground in the south simply had gone beyond the initi-
atives and thus necessitated a reappraisal of the regime
position towards the south. Neto perceived that the dead-
lock in the Namibian talks warranted the MPLA assuming a
leading role in the negotiations on behalf of the Frontline
States. In Neto*s view, SWAPO intransigence could not
continue. But, on the other hand, regime political dynamics
and political realities would not permit any alteration in
the regime's perception of QNITA. The result was a
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substantial shift in MPLA policy toward the south: the
adoption of a a two-track strategy. One was a strategy of
active negotiation within the context of the CJN plan for
Namibian independence. The other track was a strategy of
continued resistance against the UNITA insurgency and South
African attacks. The significance appeared subtle to most.
To the MPLA, the adoption of the two-track strategy marked a
clear upgrading of the negotiation option. Whereas previ-
ously the regime pursued solely confrontation policies
against UNITA and South Africa, Neto perceived that only his
forceful and open intervention into the Namibian talks could
sever the South African regional pressure and isolate UNITA.
2- The DMZ Prop osa l
The principal stumbling block in the negotiations
remained the disposition of SWAPO* s guerrillas after the
cease-fire. As a means of reactiviting the talks, the
Frontline State leaders decided to once again moderate
SWAPO* s position. Meeting in Lusaka in May, the leaders
prevailed upon Sam Nujoma to accept the South Africa*
s
primary objection to the UN plan, the provision of SWAPO
bases in Namibia. Nujoma reluctantly acquiesced that upon
South Africa's acceptance of the implementation plan, SWAPO
would in turn no longer insist upon Namibia bases. [170]
South Africa*s second objection, the insistence of UNTAG
monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia, was rejected by
not only Nujoma but also by Zambian President Kuanda. As a
result, the settlement talks once again stalled.
To overcome South African insistence on UNTAG moni-
toring, Neto offered a compromise. In June, while his son,
Jose Manuel, was undergoing surgery at the Cleveland Medical
Clinic, Neto secretly relayed a message to McHenry through
his personal Portuguese physician who was attending the
surgery. After a meeting of U.S. and Angolan officials in
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Lisbon, McHenry and Gerald Funk flew to Luanda on July 13th.
McHenry, Funk, and Neto mat at the Luandan airport at night
in order to avoid tipping off not only the Soviets and
Cubans but also SWAPO. There, Neto proposed the establish-
ment of a demilitarized zone of 50 kilometers Dn each side
of Namibia*s borders with Angolan and Zambia. Under this
plan, the ON forces could not only monitor SWAPO bases on
the Namitian side, as envisioned in the UN plan, but also
would be permitted to operate on the Angolan and Zambian
sides within the zone. Furthermore, Neto agreed to allow
the governments South Africa, Angola, and Zambia to retain
certain forces within the 100KM wide zone at designated
locations. SWAPO guerrillas, if unwilling tD return to
Namibia to participate in the independence elections, would
be restricted to their bases under Angolan supervision.
[171]
Neto^s compromise proposal was a landmark break-
through in the negotiations. Armed with a viable alterna-
tive to the South African and SWAPD positions, the Contact
Group was able to rejeunvate and refocus the negotiations.
On one hand, the compromise was intended to promote the
propects of a final settlement and to allay South African
concerns. In the larger picture, however, the compromise
reflected Neto's careful evaluation of the regional environ-
ment, the structure of that environment, regime capabilities
and constraints, and the MPLA's orientation and role.
Neto's pressure Dn SWAPO, his leading role within the
Frontline States, and his flexibility at the bargaining
table were were products of this evaluation. Clearly, Neto
hoped the regime role in the region, that of a mediator of
conflict resolution, would carry over to other forums. In
particular, Neto hoped to demonstrate to South African offi-
cials the MPLA's willingness to co-exist on the basis of
mutual respect of sovereignty. The Neto's evaluation also
94

had its political dimensions: a clsarly defined, well-known
MPLA regional role would show South Africa that the Luanda
posed no serious security threat ani r therefore, assistance
to ONITA would be unnecessary.
3 « Neto's Death: The End of an Era
As the Contact Group sought South African approval
of the DMZ proposal, Neto became seriously ill. On
September 6th, he was rushed to Moscow for treatment. Two
days larer, during exploratory surgery, doctors found an
inoperable cancer of the pancreas. On September 10th,
suffering from chronic hepatitis, cirrohosis of the liver,
and a kidney infection, Neto died at the age of 57. [172] A
month of national mourning was declared as Neto was buried
in his birthplace of Catete. Ten days later, a compromise





Previously, the pattern for most African states at inde-
pendence was to retain the foreign policy orientation
bequeathed to them by the departing colonial regime. In
spite of all the subsequent rhetoric about non-alignment,
the newly-independent African governments pursued close
ties, identification and a similar orientation with its
former metropole. In April 197U, however, a radical mili-
tary coup in Portugal set in motion of series of events that
led to the emergence of a new phenomenon, the African
Marxist-Leninist state- These new regimes embraced a
radical form of socialism and boldly rejected the idea of a
foreign policy legacy. In varying degrees, they looked more
to the foreign powars that had assisted them in the wars of
national liberation than to colonial powers. It was an
evolutionary change in the African political climate.
Although it was rooted primarily in the internal political
devslopments of each state, the African Marxist-Leninist
state adopted new foreign policy orientations based princi-
pally upon its perception of the international system and
its place in that system.
Angola was one of these countries. Upon independence,
the leaders of the MPLA fashioned a unique brand of external
relations. Regionally, the MPLA took the posture of estab-
lishing and cultivating friendly ties with only those
African stares that had energetically supported its cause
during the liberation struggle. Buffered for twenty years
by the centripetal and centrifugal forces generated by
Zairois nationalism, the MPLA kept its distance from the
array of African actors who had backed the FNLA and ONITA.
As a result, the MPLA never perceived Africa as the
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center- piece of its foreign relations. Internationally,
the MPLA instead saw that its identity and form of socialism
was more compatible with that of the socialist community. A
victor in not only an anti-colonial but also an anti-
imperialist struggle, the MPLA shunned cooperation with
Western powers in favor of links to the eastern bloc. The
MPLA perceived a commonality of interests and revolutionary
destiny with SWAPO, the ANC, and ZAPO. Thus, its foreign
relations reflected more the internationalist view within
ths pro-Soviet domain than a pan-African perspective. This
brand of external relations also fitted comfortably to the
perception of those within the myriad of internal factions
that comprised the MPLA.
Over time and as the harsh realities of nation-building
confronted the MPLA leaders, a measure of realism was
adopted. The once cne-lane ideological highway to Havana
and Moscow was broadened and redesigned to include numerous
access routes to the West. This evolution was rooted in
four areas. First, threats to regime security and legiti-
macy, in particular the border instability with Zaire and
South Africa and the UNITA insurgency, precipitiated a
change in the relations with other African states. Neto
solicited rapprochement with Zaire, accomodation in several
venues with South Africa, and pressured SWAPO to moderate
its demands. Second, internal economic realities forced a
readjustment of the regime 1 s external economic relations
that, as a consequence, extended onto the political level.
Neto courted Western powers and sought to improve relations
with them, including those that had always maintained
anti-MPLA positions. Third, the realities of participating
in the international system and its orientation with the
Soviet Union imposed costs that Neto was unwilling to bear.
He sought to diversify Angola's foreign relations and to
distance the regime from the internationally-perceived
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commitment to the Soviet bloc. Fourth, the crippling
internal dissension and factionalism forced Neto to define
more rigidly the progress and direction of the regime's
external and domestic policies. Thus, after the Nito Alves
coup, Neto asserted absolute control over the national
organs of p ods r popular, opted for a more centralized polit-
ical and economic system, and eliminate all opponents to his
policies. In the process, Neto welded absolute control over
the party and governmental institutions that were necessary
in order to transcend not only the difficulties imposed by
the international environment but also those imposed from
within the regime.
The result was the formulation of the MPLA's own brand
of non-alignment. Regionally, this was reflected in a more
active involvement and participation in those issues
confronted by the Frontline States, in cultural and economic
agreements with its neighbors Zaira and Zambia, and in the
activities of the OAO. Internationally, the MPLA estab-
lished links to numerous countries of all political persua-
sions and played a leading role in the United Nations'
effort to negotiate a transition to independence in Namibia.
Undeniably, however, the regime remained committed to the
principles cf scientific socialism and felt more comfortable
in its relationships with the socialist community.
Marxism-Leninism continued to be the rules of the game in
Luanda. Angola had chosen its owa political course irre-
spective of colonial legacies. In the process, it was
forced to adapt to its environment as it sought to reconcile
the conflicting demands of ideology and interests. Whether
its adaptation was precipitiated by internal design or by
hostile neighbors, the Angolan regime had no cause to live
in enmity with those who had chosen their own different
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